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The Department of Defense (DoD) has made a conscious decision to find ways to 
reduce infrastructure costs, and apply the savings to weapons system modernization. 
Thus the "Defense Reform Initiative" (DRI) and the "Revolution in Business Affairs" 
(RBA) were created to help achieve needed savings. The Marine Corps, along with the 
other services, is in the process of changing the way installations are operated because of 
these initiatives. Better business practices are expected to include efficiency and 
effectiveness gains through competitive sourcing of goods and services, outsourcing and 
privatizing functions that are currently done in-house, as well as consolidating like 
functions within regional (geographical) areas and reengineering business processes. 
This study examines the impact that DoD reform initiatives are having on Marine 
Corps installations using an organizational systems framework model. Findings indicate 
that the reform initiatives are being implemented. The reforms are impacting the 
operation of Marine Corps installations. Marine Corps actions for some ofthe 
organizational system elements are incongruent with stated intent. Specific 
recommendations include setting a clear direction by articulating a vision of installation 
expectations, revising the current installation structure, evolving a cultural change by 
revising system direction setting to reinforce DoD mandates, and realigning expected 
results with the direction set. 
v 
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Behind the "tip of the spear" of the United States Marine Corps' Fleet Marine 
Force (FMF) warriors lies their supporting establishment, the fifth element of the Marine 
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). By far the most substantial components of the Marine 
Corps supporting establishment are the shore installations, and the uniform Marines and 
civilians that operate them. Installations are an integral part of the MAGTF foundation. 
They enable the creation, sustainment, and deployment of Marines. Additionally, 
readiness of the operating forces, whether forward deployed or in garrison, depends on 
healthy and robust installations. Installations serve as the launch platforms; land, 
airspace, and water access make up training ranges while maneuver areas, and buildings 
provide the classrooms where Marines learn and maintain their critical battle skills. 
"Without installations, there is no readiness." (Installation Campaign Plan, 2000). 
The Marine Corps installations provide everything from live-fire "shoot and 
maneuver" training support to family homes, and everything in-between. Specific 
missions assigned to the different installations vary however all have many common 
support requirements. Common support includes: providing a home base for the Marine 
units and their equipment, providing meaningful training opportunities and support, 
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facilities to store and maintain unit equipment, and a place to live with community 
support for active duty members and their families 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has made a conscious decision to find ways to 
reduce infrastructure costs, and apply the savings to weapons system modernization. 
(Cohen, 1997). Thus the "Defense Reform Initiative" (DRI) and the "Revolution in 
Business Affairs" (RBA) were created to help achieve needed savings. The Marine 
Corps, along with the other services, is in the process of changing the way installations 
are operated. The stated intent is to reduce costs and improve services thereby becoming 
more efficient and effective. The savings generated will be used to buy-down the 
deficiency in warfighting equipment modernization. Better business practices are 
expected to emerge as the tools of the "revolution" are applied. These tools include 
efficiency (effectiveness added later) gains through competitive sourcing of goods and 
services, outsourcing and privatizing functions that are currently done in-house, as well 
as consolidating like functions within regional (geographical) areas. 
This thesis reviews the applicable business reform initiatives by conducting an 
extensive literature review of DoD directives, General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, 
business journals, magazine articles, internet articles and web pages on business reform 
initiatives in DoD and the Marine Corps, and an opinion survey of senior military and 
civilian installation leaders. The application ofDoD business reform at Marine Corps 
installations will be determined by conducting a comprehensive archival review of DoD 
and Marine Corps policies relative to business process reforms. The applicable major 
reform initiatives and policies identified will be analyzed within an organizational 
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systems framework model applicable to a complex organization. Conclusions will be 
drawn on the affects major initiatives have on the operation of Marine Corps installations 
and recommendations will be made for improving installation business practices. 
B. BUSINESS REFORM IN DOD 
In the midst of force reductions in recent years, the Department ofDefense took a . 
"holiday" from procuring modem weapon systems needed for national defense. Now that 
the drawdowns have eased and the force structure stabilized, a new problem is emerging. 
While the force reduced by near 40 percent, the cost of the infrastructure to support them 
has only reduced by some 25 percent over the same baseline. This disproportionate 
reduction in infrastructure costs is preventing the acceleration of procurement necessary 
to overcome the effects of the procurement holiday. The DoD has made a conscious 
decision to find ways to reduce infrastructure costs, and apply the savings to weapons 
system modernization. Thus the "Defense Reform Initiative" (DRI) and the "Revolution 
in Business Affairs" (RBA) were created to help achieve needed savings. (DRI, 1997). 
The "business" of operating Marine Corps installations is the system under 
review in this thesis. Installation operation requires a significant and growing proportion 
of the Operations and Maintenance budget (O&MMC) at the same time the money is 
needed for modernization and readiness improvements in the fleet. Historically, base 
operation has not been considered a true business, but rather part of the mission to be 
accomplished like any other military objective. All military services have attempted to 
maintain the ability to be self-sufficient in base operation. The expected norm is 
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providing base operation products and services with in-house resources. How efficient 
and effective the services are provided is only a secondary concern and constrained by 
the requirement to be self-sufficient. (Ackerman, 1997). 
The Department of Defense Revolution in Business Affairs and Defense Reform 
Initiative are both attempts to change the reliance on self-sufficiency and in-house service 
providers. The status quo in base operations is no longer acceptable. The priorities have 
been changed from self-reliance to providing efficient and effective products and 
services. 
C. AREA OF RESEARCH AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to conduct a comprehensive review and 
analysis of the affect DoD business process reform initiatives are having on the operation 
and management of Marine Corps installations. The research will identify recent DoD 
reform mandates impacting operation of Marine Corps installations, develop an 
organizational systems framework model of a typical Marine Corp base, and analyze the 
impact of the business reform initiatives on the operation of installations. The analysis 
will identify attributes critical to execute the required change successfully. 
The primary research question is stated as: "How are Department of Defense 
business process reforms changing the way Marine Corps installations are managed 
and operated?" 
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In addition to the primary question, additional secondary research questions will 
require investigation. Secondary research questions include: 
• What elements of the Department of Defense major reform initiative affect 
operation of Marine Corps installations? 
• Whatimpact does the Department of Defense major reform initiative have on 
the operation ofMarine Corps installations? 
• What is the current state "organizational systems model" for a typical Marine 
Corps base organization? 
• What Base operations changes have been initiated by the Marine Corps 
because of the Department of Defense major reform initiative? 
• What external environment factors are contributing to the changes in business 
processes? 
• What installation business practice mandates to the Marine Corps have 
changed? 
• What Marine Corps installation organizational system elements must change 
to support Department of Defense major reform initiatives? 
• What lessons learned from other public and private organizations can be 
applied to the Marine Corps? 
• What are the essential skills required by Marine Corps installation leaders to 
ensure successful implementation of the mandated changes? 
5 
D. SCOPE 
The primary thrust of this study will be to conduct a comprehensive review and 
analysis of recent DoD business reform initiatives and the impact they have on operation 
of Marine Corps installations. The reform initiatives will be limited to those that 
significantly impact the operation or management of a major Marine Corps installation 
and require change to current operations. The analysis will be based on an organizational 
systems framework model applied to a Marine Corps installation as the system under 
change. Conclusions will be drawn from the results of the review and analysis, and 
recommendations made in support of successful system change implementation. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The required research is predominantly in the inductive mode. The primary 
strategy in this thesis will be archival research. A secondary strategy will be opinion 
based on a survey of senior military and civilian installation leaders. The source of data 
will consist of the following: 
• Conduct an extensive literature review of DoD directives, General Accounting 
Office (GAO) reports, business journals, magazine articles, internet articles 
and web pages on business reform initiatives in DoD and the Marine Corps. 
• Conduct a comprehensive archival review of DoD and Marine Corps policies 
relative to business process reforms. 
• Conduct a survey of senior military and civilian Marine Corps installation 
leaders. 
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• Analyze the applicable major reform initiatives and policies identified within 
a systems framework model applicable to a complex organization 
• Develop and present recommendations and conclusions for successful change 
based on the systems analysis. 
F. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will provide an analysis of the impact DoD business reforms are 
having on Marine Corps installation operations. The analysis will be presented in terms 
of an organizational systems framework. This thesis is intended to assist Marine Corps 
installation leaders with the arduous task of successfully implementing business reforms. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter I provides an introduction and 
background, area of research and research questions, scope and methodology. Chapter II 
introduces the reader to a theoretical foundation of an organization and how an 
organization is represented as a system. The building blocks of organization, 
organizational system, and organization design are consolidated into the Organizational 
Systems Framework. Chapter III discusses the major business reform initiatives in DoD 
and which of these mandates will impact the operation ofMarine Corps installations. 
Chapter IV investigates the affect ofbusiness reform initiatives on Marine Corps 
installation management practices. Organizational elements are discussed using the 
Organizational Systems Framework. Survey data and analysis are presented in Chapter V 
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also using the organizational systems framework. Chapter VI provides conclusions and 
recommendations of the researcher. 
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter builds a theoretical foundation for an organizational systems 
framework that will be used to analyze the affects major change initiatives mandated by 
DoD have on the operation ofMarine Corps installations. 
Organizations are first described as systems composed of fundamental 
organizational elements. Beginning with the basic Open System Model, organizations are 
explained in terms of inputs transformed into usable outputs by interrelated elements 
functioning in a greater external environment. The outputs provide error correction 
information back to the input through feedback mechanisms. The Basic System Model is 
expanded into the Congruence Model. Organizational elements are further refined and 
the property of "fit" is introduced. The idea of a transformation process is introduced and 
defined. Strategy is introduced as an interconnecting link between input and 
transformation. Output is expanded to include the individual, the unit and the system. 
Organizational design and the Star Model are discussed. Design policies in five 
intertwined categories of strategy, structure, process, rewards, and people are introduced 
and defined. 
The building blocks of organization, organizational system, and organization 
design are consolidated into the Organizational Systems Framework. The organizational 
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elements are further defined into environment/context, key success factors, system 
direction, design factors, culture, outputs, and outcomes. 
The final section of this chapter introduces organizational change and a two-
dimensional change model. The concepts of incremental verses strategic change are 
discussed. 
The theoretical tools discussed in this chapter, especially the Organizational 
Systems Framework, will be used to analyze the affects major change initiatives 
mandated by DoD have on the operation of Marine Corps installations. 
B. ORGANIZATION 
Organization can be defined as a structured social system consisting of groups 
and individuals working together to meet some agreed upon objectives. Organizations 
consist of structured social units of people designed to work together toward achieving a 
common goal. (Greenberg, 1999) Organizational structure refers to the way groups and 
individuals are arranged within an organization with respect to the tasks they perform. 
Organizational design refers to the process of coordinating the structural elements to 
achieve the desired outcomes in an effective manner. 
The structure of an organization is traditionally illustrated by a diagram of the 
connections between the various clusters and functions called an organization chart. 
Although some elements of the organization structure (e.g. hierarchy of authority and 
span of control) may be represented by the organization chart, the actual structure is an 
abstract concept that cannot be illustrated by a simple diagram. 
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A more definitive method to represent the structure of an organization is offered 
by Henry Mintz berg. He postulated that organizations are composed of five basic 
elements as shown in Figure 2-1. (Mintzberg ,1983, 1989). 
Operating 
Core 
Figure 2-1 Mintzberg's Basic Organizational Model 
• Operating Core: Employees who perform the basic work of the organization. 
Examples include carpenters in a construction business and teachers in 
schools. 
• Strategic Apex: Top-level executives with responsibility for directing the 
entire enterprise. 
• Middle Line: Managers charged with the transfer of information from the 
strategic apex to the operating core. 
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• Technostructure: Specialists with responsibility for standardizing activities. 
Also called analysts and charged with planning work for others. 
• Support Staff: Individuals who provide indirect support to the organization. 
These five basic organizational structure elements are present in all 
organizations to some degree however any one element can dominate. 
Consideration of a single dominant element led Mintzberg to identify five specific 
organization designs, Simple Structure, Machine Bureaucracy, Professional 
Bureaucracy, Divisional Structure, and Adhocracy. 
• Simple Structure: All decision-making authority resides at the strategic apex 
and the hierarchy is flat. This design is characteristic of a small informal 
organization 
• Machine bureaucracy: Power resides with the technostructure. The work is 
highly specialized and decision-making is concentrated at the top. These 
organizations are highly stable and efficient, however resistant to change. 
• Professional bureaucracy: In this type of organization, power is with the 
operating core. They have authority to make decisions needed but do not work 
alone. Examples are medical doctors and university professors. These 
organizations are highly effective but sometimes overly narrow and fail to see 
the "big picture". 
• Divisional Structure: The classic divisional organization is General Motors. 
The middle line is where the power resides. Top executives are free to 
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concentrate on strategic decisions as the day-to-day operations are managed 
by the divisional managers. These organizations tend to have a high degree of 
duplication within the divisions. 
• Adhocracy: The power resides with the support staff. There are few formal 
rules and regulations. The employees are working together with little direction 
from authority. This type of design structure is represented by most software 
startup companies. The organization is a highly innovative environment but 
can be very inefficient. 
C. ORGANIZATION SYSTEM MODELS 
Organizations are most commonly visualized as the pyramid-shape characteristic 
ofthe organization chart typical of a classical hierarchical structure. Nadler (1997) states 
that there is a growing tendency to view organizations as a system. 
This new perspective stems from repeated observations that social 
organisms display many of the same characteristics as mechanical and 
natural systems. In particular, some theorists argue that organizations are 
better understood if they are thought of as dynamic and "open" social 
systems. 
1. Open System Model 
A system is a set of interacting and interrelated parts. (Bolman, 1991). The basic 
open system consists of a transformation process that converts inputs into usable outputs. 
The inputs are influenced by the open environment directly, and the internal environment 
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through some feedback mechanism from the output. Figure 2-2 illustrates an open system 
model. 
Organizations display many of the same characteristics as the basic system. First, 
there is internal interdependence. Changing one component of an organization will 
frequently impact another interconnected component. Second, feedback allows 
organizations to correct mistakes or to change themselves. Third, the desired or normal 
state of an organization parallels the balance or equilibrium of a stable basic system. 
Fourth, systems can produce equivalent outputs with very different configurations. 
Finally, successful systems maintain stable outputs because of their ability to adapt to 
changing environmental inputs. 
•mT:) OmUT) -1 TRANSFO RMATIO Nl 
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Figure 2-2 Open System Model 
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2. The Congruence Model 
Building upon the basic system model, Nadler and Tushman together with other 
organization researchers developed a conceptual framework of organization behavior that 
they call the Congruence Model. This model views the components of an organization as 
existing together in various states of balance they term "fit." The higher the degree of fit 
or "congruence" among the components, the more effective the organization. (Nadler, 
1997) The elements of an organization are input, strategy, transformation process and 
output as illustrated in Figure 2-3. 
Informal 
Organization 








\ People I 
t 
Figure 2-3 The Congruence Model 
15 
a. Input 
An organization does not have the ability to independently establish 
system inputs and must respond to the given conditions at any specific point in time. 
There are three main categories of inputs that affect the actions of an organization in 
different ways. 
• Environment: Organizations exist as systems within larger external 
environments. The external environment influences the organization 
through the actions of people, social and economic forces and legal 
constraints. The environment often makes demands on the 
organization and imposes constraints on the organization's actions. At 
the same time the environment offers opportunities for the 
organization to succeed. 
• Resources: Resources include both tangible and intangible assets. 
Tangible assets are the employees, capital, technology and information 
that an organization contains. Perception of the organization and 
organizational culture are examples of intangible assets. 
• History: Research indicates that the way an organization functions in 
the present is greatly influenced by how it responded in the past 
(Nadler, 1991). Behavior of key leaders, response to past crises, and 
evolution of values all contribute to the how an organization will act. 
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h. Strategy 
Strategy flows from a shared vision of the organization's future. Strategy 
can be defined as explicit choices about markets, technology, and competencies an 
organization intends to pursue. The choices are business decisions on the allocation of 
scarce resources against the demands, constraints and opportunities offered by the 
environment. (Bolman, 1991 ). 
c. Output 
Output describes not only what an organization produces, but also how 
well it performs. Collectively, the performance of the individuals and groups within the 
system define the performance of an organization. The performance of an organization is 
specified by how well it uses the available resources in support of meeting strategic 
objectives, and further how well the strategy has been achieved. A third measure of 
success is how well the organization adjusts to a changing environment, both to seize 
opportunity and to defend against threats. 
d. Transformation Process 
The transformation process represents how the organization converts 
inputs into outputs. The organization consists of four distinct components: The work or 
tasks to be accomplished, the individuals or people who do the tasks, the formal 
organization or structure and the informal organization or culture. 
17 
• The work. The basic or inherent tasks to be done by the individuals, 
groups or entire organization. 
• The People. The collective knowledge, skills, abilities and experience 
of the individuals tasked to do the work. 
• The Formal Organization. The structure of the organization 
including policies, processes and methods fonnally created to get 
individuals to perform the tasks. 
• The Informal Organization. The unwritten informal nonns, values, 
beliefs, and accepted behaviors that evolve within an organization. 
The informal organization is often referred to as organizational culture 
or operating environment. 
D. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN FRAMEWORK 
Organizational design is a tool used by management to effectively shape decisions 
and influence employee behavior. Design choices can be viewed as a series of 
fundamental policies established by management. An effective organizational design 
requires management to be skilled at developing these design policies. Figure 2-4 
illustrates one framework commonly used for organizational design called "the star 
model". In the star model design policies are categorized by the five intertwined 
categories of strategy, structure, processes, reward, and people. (Galbraith, 1995) 
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Figure 2-4 The Star Model 
1. Strategy 
Strategy specifies the direction ofthe organization in terms ofmission, values, 
goals and objectives. Strategy is typically the first organizational component to be 




The placement of power and authority are determined by the organization 
structure. Structure policies can be categorized into four areas. The first category is 
specialization, which refers to the number and type of job specialties. The second 
category is shape, which refers to the number of people and span of control at each level 
of the organization. Third is the distribution of power in two dimensions. The vertical 
dimension represents the classical centralized or decentralized distribution while the 
horizontal dimension refers to the lateral flow of power to the departments dealing 
directly with mission. Finally, the fourth category is departmentalization referring to the 
formation of departments around the standard dimensions of functions, products, 
workflow processes, markets, and geography. 
3. Processes 
Decision and information system processes link the organization in both the 
vertical and horizontal directions. Vertical processes operate to allocate the scarce 
resources ofhuman talent and funds. Horizontal or lateral processes link organizational 
elements around workflow. (Galbraith, 1995). 
4. Rewards 
Reward systems provide incentive and motivation for accomplishment of goals 
supporting strategic direction as set by management. The purpose of a reward system is 
to align employee goals and direction with the goals of the organization. 
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5. People 
The human resource policies of recruiting, selecting, employee development, 
education and training produce the human talent required to achieve the strategic 
direction specified by management. Specifically, the human resource policies build the 
organizational capabilities to execute the strategic direction. 
E. ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK 
The organizational models discussed provide the ability to analyze specific 
elements of organizations. The organizational systems framework (Roberts, 2000) 
illustrated in Figure 2-5 consolidates the attributes of these models with others to provide 
a more comprehensive tool for total organization analysis. This thesis will use the 
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Environment refers to the larger external environment. The system co-exists 
within this larger environment. The external environment influences the organization 
through the actions of people, social and political factors, technological and economic 
forces, and legal constraints. The environment often makes demands on the organization 
and imposes constraints on the organization's actions. At the same time the environment 
offers opportunities for the organization to succeed. 
In addition to the external environment, the context means resources and history 
of the organization. Resources include both tangible and intangible assets. Tangible 
assets are the employees, capital, technology and information that an organization 
contains. Perception of the organization and organizational culture are examples of 
intangible assets. The history of an organization greatly influences the way it functions in 
the present. Past behavior of key leaders, response to past crises, and evolution of values 
all contribute to how an organization will act. 
2. Key Success Factors 
What does it take for the system to be successful? Key success factors are the 
critical indicators against which an organization must demonstrate at least adequate 
performance if it is to prosper. The specific factors will differ for each organization and 
are likely to be more numerous and inherently more ambiguous for public organizations 
(Nutt and Backoff, 1992, 1993). 
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Although specific key success factors will vary, some generalizations such as 
Peters' and Waterman's (1982) eight "excellent" criteria for characterizing successfully 
managed companies may be useful. The eight criteria include: 
• A bias for action. Companies that meet this criterion quickly identify 
problems, find answers, and implement them. 
• Close to the customer. Excellent organizations spend a great deal of 
time and effort listening closely to what their customers want, and 
strive to meet those needs in a way that emphasizes quality, reliability, 
and service. 
• Autonomy and entrepreneurship. Excellent companies promote 
innovation and risk taking. 
• Productivity through people. People are viewed by excellent 
companies as a valuable resource--indeed, their most valuable 
resource. 
• Hands-on, value-driven. Excellent companies all have a clearly 
articulated philosophy and set of key values, and their executives and 
employees behave in accord with them. People are deeply involved; 
they live the business. 
• Stick to the knitting. The excellent companies do not move far from 
the business that they know how to run. They have core businesses 
that remain the core; they do not pursue ideas or acquisitions that are 
at odds with those businesses. 
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• Simple form, lean staff. Structural forms are kept simple, and 
corporate staffs are kept relatively small. 
• Simultaneous loose-tight properties. Excellent companies have some 
core values to which they cleave almost fanatically, but at the same 
time, they promote decentralization, and autonomy in decision-making 
and action as long as they are in accord with the core values. 
3. System Direction 
System direction is a management process that converts input to the organization 
from the external environment (including higher authority) into steering or guiding 
direction for the entire organization. Direction setting is one point where management 
can intervene in order to cause a change in the organizational system. The overall system 
direction is determined by the following critical attributes. 
a. Mandate 
Mandates are both formal and informal requirements on what to do (and 
not do) from external authorities. Formal mandates are typically codified in laws, 
regulations and the like. Informal mandates are generally embodied in cultural norms and 
expectations of stakeholders. (Bryson, 1995). 
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b. Values 
The values of an organization are part of a belief system that determines 
behavioral norms. Underlying organizational values drive decisions, particularly those 
decisions that determine future direction. Values are typically part of an organizational 
philosophy of operations and help explain how an organization approaches its work, 
manage internal affairs, and relate to the external environment. Values can differ between 
organization segments and especially individuals. 
c. Mission 
Mission is simply the purpose or reason an organization exists. 
d. Strategic Issues 
Strategic issues are fundamental policy questions or challenges that affect 
an organization's mandates, values, or mission. (Ansoff, 1980). 
e. Vision 
A vision provides clarity of an organization's direction and purpose. 
Vision specifies success in terms of mission, core values, basic strategies, goals and 
performance factors, ethical standards and important rules for decision-making. A vision 
should illustrate a future state and a path to get there. 
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f. Goals 
Assignment of specific, challenging, yet achievable goals can lead to 
enhanced organizational performance. Feedback concerning goal attainment is a critical 
element in the effectiveness of goal setting. (Locke, 1990). 
g. Strategies 
Strategy specifies the direction of the organization in terms of mission, 
values, goals and objectives. The pattern developed by organizational policies, programs, 
actions, decisions, and resource allocation define a strategy. Strategy is typically the first 
organizational component to be addressed because it establishes the criteria for choosing 
among alternative organizational forms. 
4. Design Factors 
Organization design factors refer to the individual elements and the construct of 
an organization. The design factor elements included in this model are similar to the 
Congruence Model transformation process. Each of the design factors may be modified 
by management intervention to obtain system change. The congruence or "fit" of these 
elements is critical to the overall system operation. 
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a. Tasks/Jobs 
The work of an organization is comprised of the basic or inherent tasks to 
be done by the individuals, groups or entire organization. Jobs are structured and 
arranged around the tasks to be accomplished. 
b. Technology 
Technology refers to the processes, both physical and mental, used to 
transform inputs into usable outputs. In this context technology is more than 
technological devices and equipment used by people, but includes their knowledge and 
activities as well. Technology affects the behavior of individuals and the functioning of 
organizations. Enhancing the technology of an organization can lead to more efficient 
and effective transformation of inputs into outputs. 
Charles Perrow (1967) provides a useful way to categorize technology of 
an organization in two basic dimensions. The first dimension is called exceptions, the 
degree to which an organization makes use of standard inputs to tum out standard 
outputs. If the process encounters few exceptions during the transformation, the 
technology is labeled as routine. If many exceptions occur, the technology is labeled as 
nonroutine. Perrow's second dimension, called problems, refers to the degree which the 
situations encountered must be analyzed. (Greenberg, 1999). Ifthe situations allow for 
programmed decision-making, the problem is classified as easy to analyze. Problems that 
are complex and require nonprogrammed decision-making are classified as difficult to 
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analyze. Using these two dimensions, Perrow identified four specific technology types as 
summarized in Table 2-1. 
Exceptions Problems Technology Type 
Few Easy to analyze Routine Technology (e.g., assembly line 
manufacturing, vocational training) 
Difficult to analyze Craft Technology (e.g., cabinet making, 
public schools) 
Many Easy to analyze Engineering Technology (e.g., heavy 
machinery construction, health and fitness 
club) 
Difficult to analyze Nonroutine Technology (e.g., research unit, 
psychiatric hospital) 
TABLE 2-1 PERROW'S MATRIX OF TECHNOLOGIES 
The first technology type is known as routine technology. Highly 
standardized inputs and outputs with few problems that are easy to analyze are 
characteristic. Examples would include assembly line manufacturing and vocational 
education. 
When inputs and outputs are highly standardized but encountered 
problems are more difficult to analyze the technology is characteristic of Perrow's second 
type called craft technology. Examples of craft technology are cabinetmakers and public 
schools. 
The third technology type is called engineering technology and is 
characterized by many exceptions that can be dealt with in standard ways. Examples 
would include heavy machinery construction, and health and fitness club operation. 
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Finally, operations with many exceptions that are difficult to analyze are 
classified as nonroutine technology. Examples would include research and development, 
and psychiatric hospitals. 
c. Structure 
Organizational structure refers to the way groups and individuals are , 
arranged within an organization with respect to the tasks they perform. The structure of 
the organization is typically established based on the policies, processes and methods 
formally created to get individuals to perform the tasks. An important consideration is the 
organization design or the process of coordinating the structural elements to achieve the 
desired outcomes in an effective manner. 
d. People 
There is substantial evidence of a strong connection between how an 
organization manages their people and the success it will achieve. (Pfeffer, 1999). 
Understanding the experience and background, motives, expectations and mindsets of 
their people is of critical importance to an organization. 
e. Processes/Subsystems 
Processes and subsystems are what interconnect and link the elements or 
design factors of an organization together. 
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• Financial Management, Measurement and Controls 
Financial management, budgeting and control are fundamental processes 
of organization management. Accountability and control are the steps a manager takes to 
assure performance conforms as near as practical to plan. (Newman, 1975) 
• Human Resource Management 
Human resource management includes the policies of recruiting, selecting, 
employee development, education and training that produce the human talent required to 
achieve the strategic direction specified by management. Also included in human 
resource management are the reward systems that provide incentive and motivation for 
accomplishment of goals. The purpose of a reward system is to align employee goals and 
direction with the goals of the organization. Human resource policies build the 
organizational capabilities to execute the strategic direction set by management. 
• Communication, Information, Planning, and Decision Making 
Decision and information system processes link the organization in both 
the vertical and horizontal directions. How information is gathered and processed are 
important considerations in decision-making and communication processes. 
• Acquisition and Contracting 
Another important process of an organization is what goods and services 
are obtained from external sources, and how they are procured. 
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5. Culture 
Nadler and Tushman ( 1997) identify the basic components of organizational 
culture as values, beliefs, and norms. Organizational core values are what an organization 
"believes" to be good or bad. These values cannot be proved or disproved, either you 
agree or disagree. Beliefs are specific views on how the world works. Beliefs may or may 
not be true and are open to debate. Beliefs are often built around cause and effect 
relationship. Norms represent the behavior or expectation of behavior caused by the 
values and beliefs of an organization. 
Organizational culture cannot be acted upon directly by management intervention. 
Management causes a cultural change by intervening in system direction setting or 
organization design factors. Organizational culture is a result ofbehavior and attitudes of 
the people within the organization. To effect a cultural change, it is necessary to change 
design factors that will cause a change in attitudes and behavior. (Beer, 1990). 
6. Outputs 
Output describes the goods or services the organization produces in very general 
terms. One indicator of success for the organization can be measured in terms of output. 
Performance can be determined in terms of three factors. First, how well does the 
organization meet strategic objectives. Second, how well does the organization use scarce 
resources. Third, how successful the organization is at positioning itself to seize the 
opportunities and stave off the threats presented by the environment. 
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7. Outcomes 
The outcomes of an organization can be defined as the consequences or 
implication of the outputs to stakeholders. Outcomes must be viewed by the organization 
in context with the external environment. 
F. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
Organizational change may involve one or more elements of the organizational 
system, or may involve realignment of the entire system and affect all critical elements. 
Managing issues during the change process becomes a fundamental concern. Beckhard 
and Harris ( 1977) identified three critical issues for maintaining congruence during the 
change process. ( 1) Managing the political dynamics associated with the change process. 
(2) Motivating constructive behavior of the workforce with the anxiety created by the 
change. (3) Actively managing the transition process to a new end state. 
Later Nadler and Tushman (1989) identified additional issues when applied to 
large-scale, complex organizational change. Large-scale complex change involves some 
or all of the following attributes. 
• Multiple transitions. Complex change involving many different transitions 
simultaneously. They individual transitions may be independent of each other. 
• Incomplete transitions. Many of the complex changes may be overcome by 
events before they are completed. Some may be replaced by subsequent 
changes while others cease. 
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• Uncertain future states. The end-state resulting from a complex change may 
be too difficult to describe. Other times the target end-state evolves as the 
change process unfolds. 
• Transitions over long periods. Large-scale change processes can take three 
to seven years to implement. The dynamics required to manage long period 
change are different from short term. 
Organizational change can be considered in two dimensions as illustrated in 
Figure 2-6. The first dimension considered is scope. Changes that focus on individual 
organizational elements and maintain or re-establish congruence are "incremental" 
changes. Changes that break organizational congruence and involve the entire system or 
strategy are "strategic" changes. The second dimension views the change in relation to 
external events. Changes that are responses to specific events are called "reactive." 
Changes initiated prior to or in anticipation of an event are called "anticipatory" changes. 
Incremental Strategic 
Anticipatory Tuning Reorientation 
Reactive Adaptation 
Figure 2-6 Types of Organizational Change 
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The following four categories of change result. 
• Tuning. Change that is incremental in anticipation of a future event. This type 
of change seeks to increase organizational efficiency without an immediate 
problem driving the change. 
• Adaptation. Incremental change made in response to a trigger event. The 
event requires change in one or more of the organizational elements but does 
not require fundamental change throughout the entire organization. 
• Reorientation. Strategic change requiring redirection of the entire 
organization, but with the need for change having been made in advance of an 
event that would ultimately require the change. Nadler and Tushman (1989) 
refer to this level of change as "frame-bending" because the intent is to bring 
about significant change without "breaking" the organizational frame. 
• Re-creation. Strategic change usually initiated in response to a trigger event 
that threatens the very existence of the organization. Response to the event 
requires a radical change in the organization. 
35 
The intensity or severity of impact the change has on the organization ranges from 
low to high. See Figure 2-7 for illustration. Strategic change, and specifically re-creation 
is the most severe, while anticipatory change is lower, with tuning having the least 
impact. 
High 




Figure 2-7 Types of Change Management 
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G. SUMMARY 
This chapter describes a theoretical framework for organizations, organization 
systems, and organizational change that can be used to analyze organizations undergoing 
major change. The first section draws from Mintzberg's fundamental organization 
structure view and defines the interrelation of his five basic organizational elements. 
Organizations are next described as systems composed of fundamental 
organizational elements. Beginning with the basic Open System Model, organizations are 
explained in terms of inputs transformed into usable outputs by interrelated elements 
functioning in a greater external environment. The outputs provide error correction 
information back to the input through feedback mechanisms. 
The Basic System Model is expanded into the Congruence Model ofNadler and 
Tushman. Organizational elements are further refined and the property of "fit" is 
introduced. Input is defined in terms of the components of environment, resources, and 
history. The idea of a transformation process is introduced and defined in terms ofwork, 
people, formal, and informal organization. Strategy is introduced as an interconnecting 
link between input and transformation. Output is expanded to include the individual, the 
unit and the system. 
Organizational design and the Star Model of Galbraith are discussed next. Design 
policies in five intertwined categories of strategy, structure, process, rewards, and people 
are introduced and defined. 
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The building blocks of organization, organizational system, and organization 
design are next consolidated and the Organizational Systems Framework provided by 
Roberts is introduced. The organizational elements are further defined into 
environment/context, key success factors, system direction, design factors, culture, 
outputs, and outcomes. Each specific element is expanded and the interrelationship 
between elements discussed. 
The final section of this chapter introduces organizational change and a two-
dimensional change model provided by Nadler and Tushman. The concepts of 
incremental verses strategic change are discussed. 
The theoretical tools discussed in this chapter, especially the Organizational 
Systems Framework, will be used to analyze the affects major change initiatives 
mandated by DoD have on the operation of Marine Corps installations. 
38 
III. DOD BUSINESS REFORM INITIATIVES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses major business reform initiatives DoD has initiated and 
summarizes what measures are expected to have a major impact on changing Marine 
Corps installation management practices. The discussion begins by reviewing events that 
have led to the need for business reform. An aging population, the end of the Cold War, 
and a quarter century of deficit spending, has all contributed to substantial pressure for 
reducing defense expenditures. 
The United States is at a technological transition point, moving into the 
"Information Age" and entering a period of a "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA). 
The military services and DoD are engaged in transformational change to support the 
RMA needs at the same time that fiscal reality is demanding reduced budgets. Clearly, 
the resources to support the RMA transformation must come from elsewhere within the 
DoD. Thus a "Revolution in Business Affairs" (RBA) has evolved to redefine business 
functions and performance in order to increase efficiency while maintaining the 
effectiveness of DoD support functions. The RBA is expected to yield resources 
necessary to reinvest in the transformation. 
The military service Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) published Joint Vision 2010 a 
template for the evolution of the armed forces into the 21st century. The document 
identifies the operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full 
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dimension protection and focused logistics as the tenets of full spectrum dominance that 
will be the essential characteristic for the armed forces in the next century. 
The DoD initiated a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force to investigate how 
privatization and outsourcing could effect cost savings, quality improvements, and 
increased efficiencies for DoD activities while releasing financial and human resources to 
enhance readiness and modernization. The Task Force was directed to study and address 
activities DoD is currently doing that could be performed by the private sector with 
greater efficiency, at lower cost, and with higher quality. The Task Force investigated 
both public and private sector experiences to determine the process DoD should follow to 
carry out an effective privatization and outsourcing program. The Task Force reviewed 
lessons learned to determine what DoD should take into consideration when 
implementing an outsourcing plan. 
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process is intended to examine DoD 
strategy, force structure, modernization and infrastructure once every four years. The 
focus of the QDR was to build a solid financial foundation that would support the future 
warfighting capabilities described by Joint Vision 2010. Congress, dissatisfied with the 
slow pace of reform in the DoD by the executive branch, hoped to accelerate the 
restructuring ofthe department with the QDR. 
The transformation of the forces is achievable, but dependent on our ability to 
shift resources from overhead and support functions by bringing about a "Revolution in 
Business Affairs" (RBA). The Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) strives to achieve the 
RBA. The DRI will be guided by the principles of focusing the enterprise on a unifying 
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vision, commitment of the leadership team to change, focusing on core competencies, 
streamlining organizations for agility, investment in people, exploiting information 
technology, and breaking down barriers between organizations. 
The DRI applies the guiding principles to define initiatives in four areas. The first 
area is reengineering by adopting modern business practices to achieve world-class 
standards of performance. The second focus area is consolidating by streamlining 
organizations to remove redundancy and maximize synergy. The Third area is 
competition by applying market mechanisms to improve quality, reduce costs, and 
respond to customer needs. The fourth focus area is elimination by reducing excess 
support structures to free resources and focus on core competencies. 
The Military force Structure Act of 1996 required the convening of a National 
Defense Panel (NDP) to report on the significant issues facing DoD as it transitions into 
the 21st century. The panel evaluated the future operational environment from 2010 to 
2020 against the force capabilities necessary to meet defense challenges of the future. 
The NDP viewed fundamental reform of the DoD support infrastructure as a critical 
element necessary to support a successful transformation strategy for 2010-2020. The 
report noted that DoD infrastructure of today was unaffordable and that meaningful 
reform was not possible unless DoD embraced a more effective business-like approach. 
Over the past decade, the private sector has successfully transformed their 
business practices in response to increasing global competition. The Department of the 
Navy (DoN) views these changes as revolutionary and hopes to capture some of the same 
innovation to dramatically improve similar Navy business functions. According to a 
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report from the Naval Studies Board (NSB), DoN expects the RBA will achieve between 
$3.5 and $5.0 billion in annual savings for modernization. 
B. FISCAL BACKGROUND 
With the end of the Cold War came the expectation for a peace dividend. The 
American public and the Congress believe a smaller military force and reduced DoD 
budgets should result from the demise of the Soviet threat. The United States dominates 
the world as never before. Not only do we enjoy the largest and most productive 
economy, our troops have the most advanced equipment and our defense spending 
accounts for one-third of the entire world's defense outlays. (Bandow, 1998). 
Some would argue that a smaller force is justified because there is no viable 
major military threat on the horizon for at least the next 15 years. (George, 1999). Others 
point to escalating entitlement spending as a more tangible and immediate reason for 
reducing the defense budget. Mandatory spending on interest and entitlements will have 
grown from 22.7 percent to 72 percent of the Federal budget over the forty years from 
1963 to 2003. Figure 3-1 shows how the mandatory spending has grown. (CBO, 1999) 
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Growth of Mandatory Spending in the 
Federal Budget 1963-2003 
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Figure 3-1 Mandatory Spending 
The largest force behind the continued growth in entitlement spending is the rapid 
rise in spending for Medicare and Medicaid. (Crippen, 1999) Assuming no change in 
policy, Medicare costs are expected to grow from 2.5 percent of Gross Domestic product 
(GDP) in 1999 to 4.9 percent GDP by 2030. The Congressional Budget Office projects 
spending on Medicare costs to increase from 13 percent of the Federal budget in 1999 to 
20 percent by 2009 and further to 26 percent by 2030 as the baby boomer generation 
ages. As the mandatory portion of the Federal budget increases, there will be less 
available for discretionary expenses, including national defense. (Steuerle, 1998) Figure 
3-2 depicts the increase in all mandatory expenditures. 
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The rising costs of entitlements have been only one of the concerns with the 
Federal budget. For a quarter century, the annual expenditures of our Federal government 
have exceeded the available revenues. The resulting deficit spending has led to a 
cumulative federal debt of over S5.6 trillion by 1999. (PresBud, 2000). Just the amount of 
interest payments required each year results in 12 percent of the total annual budget. The 
principle represents money borrowed primarily from the American people, including a 
substantial amount from the Social Security trust fund. 
The budget surpluses we see today are chiefly due to three separate acts passed by 
the congress over the last 10 years to implement sensible fiscal policy. (AARON, 1999) 
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The first of these bills was the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990, which 
established "caps" or limits on the amount of discretionary spending. The BEA also 
created mandatory legislation requiring "pay as you go" (PAYGO) as a mechanism to 
ensure all program increases (or decreases) in expenditures are funded. The other two 
bills are the Taxpayer Relief Act and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, both requiring 
balancing tax increases with spending reductions. These measures have little effect on the 
mandatory portion of the budget, but result in reduced discretionary funds across the 
board. Figure 3-3 illustrates the result on federal outlays for FY 2000. 
Eliminating the federal budget deficit and reducing the grov.th of national debt 
has become a priority within the government. Fiscal policy is as much a reason for 
reducing the costs of DoD as the end of the Cold War. With the aging of the baby boomer 
generation, entitlement spending for Medicare and social security will continue to grow 
at an alarming rate. For these reasons, DoD must find ways to reduce costs. 
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Figure 3-3. Federal Budget Outlays 
Cost reduction and reform in the DoD has been a primary concern for the past 
decade. The first major attempts at reform probably began with the "Bottom Up Review" 
(BlJR) and the Presidents "Commission on Roles and :vfission" (COR.T\1) in the early 
1990's. The reform initiative became more urgent and a central focus developed near the 
middle of the decade with the Quadrennial Defense Review, the "Defense Reform 
Initiative" (DRI) and the "Revolution in Business Affairs" (RBA). Reducing the costs of 
the support infrastructure through better business practices is expected to release the 
funds necessary to support modernization. 
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C. JOINT VISION 2010 
The military service Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) published Joint Vision 2010 in 
1996 as the conceptual template for the evolution of the armed forces into the 21st 
century. The document identifies the operational concepts of dominant maneuver, 
precision engagement, full dimension protection and focused logistics as the tenets of full 
spectrum dominance that will be the essential characteristic for the armed forces in the 
next century. Although not specifically addressing the supporting establishment 
infrastructure in detail, several critical success attributes have potentially significant 
implications. 
The vision calls for maintaining a careful balance between the "tooth and tail" of 
force structure while assuring an efficient and effective support structure is maintained. 
The balance has become skewed and over 60 percent of DoD's budget is spent on support 
functions considered as the Tail. (BENS, 1997). In addition, the vision emphasizes that 
risks and expenditures will be even more closely scrutinized than they are at present 
when faced with flat budgets and increasingly more costly readiness and modernization. 
Simply to retain effectiveness with less redundancy, "will require wringing every ounce 
of capability from every available resource." (Joint Vision 2010, 1996). The vision 
implies the desired outcome can only be accomplished through a seamless integration of 
Service capabilities. To achieve this integration, DoD must find the most effective way to 




The conceptual template established by Joint Vision 2010 was augmented in 2000 
with the publication of Joint Vision 2020. However, no additional information on the 
supporting establishment infrastructure requirements was provided by the new document. 
D. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD STUDY 
In October 1995 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology 
(USD A&T) formed a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Privatization and 
Outsourcing. The DSB Task Force was chartered as a "strategy to effect cost savings, 
quality improvements, and increased efficiencies for DoD activities while releasing 
financial and human resources to enhance readiness and modernization." (DSB, 1996). 
The Task Force was directed to study and address the following issues: 
• What activities is DoD currently doing that could be performed by the private 
sector with greater efficiency, at lower cost, and with higher quality? 
• What DoD functions should receive priority attention? 
• Based on private sector experience, what levels of savings should be 
expected? 
• How long will it take for savings to be realized and what, if any, up front costs 
or investment will be required? 
• What terms and conditions will encourage or discourage commercial entities 
from competing for opportunities? 
• What process should DoD follow to carry out an effective privatization and 
outsourcing program? 
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• What lessons can be drawn from the private sector experience about 
implementing an outsourcing plan? 
• What personnel, accounting, or other organizational implications for 
implementing privatization should DoD take into consideration? 
• What specific actions should DoD take over the next year to accelerate the 
shift to privatization and outsourcing? 
In addition to assessing the outsourcing experience of the commercial sector, the 
Task Force was also directed to examine experience in other countries, and the United 
States experience in state and local governments as part of the study. The Task Force 
final report was published in August 1996. (DSB, 1996). 
The Task Force report defines "outsourcing" as a general concept that 
incorporates the more narrow case of"privatization." The specific definitions are as 
follows: 
Outsourcing refers to the transfer of a support function traditionally 
performed by an in-house organization to an outside service provider. 
Outsourcing occurs in both the public and private sectors. While the 
outsourcing firm or government organization continues to provide 
appropriate oversight, the vendor is typically granted extensive flexibility 
regarding how the work is performed. In successful outsourcing 
arrangements, the vendor utilizes new technologies and business practices 
to improve service delivery and/or reduce support costs. Vendors are 
usually selected as the result of a competition among qualified bidders. 
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Privatization is a subset of outsourcing that applies only to the public 
sector. Privatization actions involve not only the contracting out of 
support functions, but also the transfer of facilities, equipment, and other 
government assets to private venders. Government organizations often 
outsource support functions without privatizing public assets. 
The view of the Task Force was that most DoD outsourcing initiatives are not 
likely to involve asset transfer therefore, the study concentrated on the general concept of 
outsourcing. 
1. The Challenge 
The DSB Task Force report noted that the pace of equipment modernization is 
insufficient to sustain the military forces over the long term. While DoD is well equipped 
today, procurement levels must grow from near $38 billion to about $68 billion in five 
years just to maintain current levels. Because of deficit reduction efforts and other 
competing national priorities, top-line defense budgets are not likely to grow significantly 
and may continue to decline in real terms. (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-187, 1997). Therefore, 
additional funding for modernization will need to come from reducing costs and shifting 
existing resources. 
The potential sources of additional funds were identified as further force structure 
reductions, additional base closures and other infrastructure consolidations, and the 
streamlining of support functions. The Task Force considered further force reductions as 
impractical and unwise leaving two alternatives. The Task force also evaluated further 
infrastructure consolidations as unlikely to generate significant savings in the short term, 
especially given that congress was unlikely to authorize new base closure actions. The 
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opinion expressed by the Task Force was the only practical alternative was to sharply 
reduce support costs and to apply the savings to modernization. "If extensive savings are 
to be achieved, DoD must abandon its traditional reliance on in-house support 
organizations and support a new paradigm that capitalizes on the efficiency and creativity 
of the private sector." (DSB, 1996). 
2. Private Sector Experience 
The private sector initially viewed outsourcing as a method to reduce support 
costs however, as experience with outsourcing has expanded they have developed a 
broader view of the benefits. Additional benefits realized from outsourcing include 
increased ability to concentrate on core competencies, greater access to innovative 
technologies and business solutions, and improved service quality and responsiveness. 
(BENS, 1997). The DSB Task Force expects benefits and savings from outsourcing to be 
significantly higher in the government sector because of the relative inefficient inhouse 
support providers. 
Private sector firms spent an estimated $100 billion for outsourced services in 
1996 resulting in savings of 10 to 15 percent of the total function costs. (Bernasconi, 
1996). A 1995 survey by the Outsourcing Institute found that outsourcing firms have 
achieved significant improvements in quality and customer service. Outsourcing is not 
only an effective tactic for reducing costs, but has become a critical element of 
competitive strategy. Outsourcing is a commonly used tool by the private sector and 
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more than 90 percent believe these initiatives have been successful according to another 
study conducted by Arthur Andersen in 1995. 
Most service providers in the outsourcing industry fall into one of three general 
business functions: information technology (IT), business logistics, and business services. 
The functional areas of IT include data center operations, network support, systems 
integration, software maintenance, application development, and telecommunications. 
Information technology is the single largest service function accounting for up to two 
thirds of the value of all outsourcing contracts. Business logistics is the second largest 
outsourcing functional area and includes the functions of inventory management, 
warehousing, and transportation services. Business service functions include general 
administration, benefits administration, and facility management and maintenance. The 
DoD has chosen to limit outsourcing to functions not considered to be "core" 
competencies. (Stafford, 1996). 
The DSB Task Force found that the private sector outsourcing process is 
comprised of three phases: the presolicitation phase, the solicitation phase, and the 
implementation phase. The average time to complete the entire outsourcing process is 
14.6 months, with the shortest time about six months and the longest time about 24 
months. The timeline is relatively short when compared to the DoD average procurement 
process of 24 to 30 months for contract award with additional time for implementation. 
The Task Force identified several critical success factors to the private sector 
outsourcing initiative. The lessons learned from the private sector include: 
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Senior executive leadership: Successful outsourcing actions require the active 
involvement of senior executive leadership. The leadership must be sustained through 
development of the request for proposal (RFP), selection of the vendor, and 
implementation of the transition plan. Delegating outsourcing to middle managers who 
may be affected by the outsourcing action was not effective as they typically resist the 
change. 
Outsource broad processes: Outsourcing of broad functional areas rather than 
single functions or a group of tasks leads to greater synergy and decreased contract 
management and oversight. Contracting an entire functional area also leads to greater 
control and accountability. 
View benefits from life cycle: Benefits accrue over the life of the contract. 
Improvement may not occur immediately after the function is outsourced and it may 
require a considerable effort for the vendor to reengineer the process. Evaluation should 
not occur after the first year, but at the conclusion of the project and with a lifecycle 
perspective. 
Small, highly trained oversight cadre: Successful outsourcing firms tend to use 
a small oversight and contract administration staff to interact with the vendor on a daily 
basis. The oversight and administration personnel are generally collocated with the 
vendor. 
Establish a partnership between outsourcer and vendor: The outsourcing firm 
should cultivate a collaborative relationship with the vendor. Emphasis should be given 
to identifying and resolving problems as early as possible. 
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Performance specification and best value solicitations: Outsourcing yields 
greater benefits when the service provider is encouraged to apply improved technology 
and better business practices to reengineer the support function. Solicitations should use 
performance standards to encourage providers to apply innovative solutions. Selection 
criteria should be based on best value. 
Contract scope mutual agreement: The primary source of problems in 
outsourcing is disagreement between parties on the scope of work. The client and the 
vendor must thoroughly discuss the statement of work to come to a true meeting of the 
minds. Outsourcing contracts can be extremely complicated and firms with little 
outsourcing experience should hire specialists or consultants. 
Performance incentives: Performance incentives are an important tool to align 
the interests of the vendor with the client. Incentives are typically used to reward the 
vendor for reducing costs and improving service quality or responsiveness. 
Long-term contracts: The standard length of large service contracts in the 
private sector is five to ten years and rarely less than three. The benefits from outsourcing 
accrue in the long run after process reengineering. 
Market forces: Outsourcing firms utilize market forces by applying competitive 
pressures to the marketplace for support functions traditionally performed by inhouse 
monopolies. Service contracts are awarded through a competitive process. The contracts 
generally include performance incentives to encourage cost reductions and service 
improvements. 
54 
Continuous communications: Successful firms keep the workforce well 
informed throughout the outsourcing process. Unions are engaged early and given an 
opportunity to have input into the outsourcing process. 
Reemployment: The vendor must typically employ large numbers of workers in 
a short period after contract award. One solution is to require the vendor to give "first 
right of refusal" to the displaced workforce. 
Transitional assistance: Most companies with extensive outsourcing experience 
provide transitional assistance to those affected employees. Assistance includes 
opportunity to seek employment elsewhere in the company; severance pay based on 
length of service; early retirement to qualified employees; retraining; and outplacement 
services. 
3. Public Sector Experience 
Many State and local governments have adopted a strategy of public-private 
competition and outsourcing to reduce costs and improve service delivery. Success 
stories include Kansas City, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Phoenix, and Indianapolis. 
The City oflndianapolis for example has conducted 60 public-private 
competitions for several municipal functions including: airport operations and 
maintenance, information technology (IT), facility maintenance and management, fleet 
maintenance and management, road maintenance, solid waste collection and wastewater 
treatment. About half of the competitions are won by private sector vendors. From 1983-
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92, the city budget was increasing by about $20 million annually. By 1996 the budget has 
declined for four straight years and is now $90 million below the trend. 
The Task Force found that DoD devoted about 850,000 full time equivalents 
(FTE) to commercial-type activities (CA) in 1994. Ofthe total, about 210,000 FTEs or 
only about one quarter was performed by outside contractors. The 640,000 inhouse FTEs 
are split about half between military and civilian personnel. The FTEs were involved in 
over 150 different functions in the following categories: 
• Social services. 
• Base maintenance. 
• Data processing. 
• Health services. 
• RDT &E support. 
• Manufacturing and fabrication. 
• Intermediate maintenance. 
• Installation services. 
• Maintenance ofreal property. 
• Depot maintenance. 
• Education and Training. 
• Other non-manufacturing. 
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The Task Force stated view was that most support functions involving CA should 
be performed by outside vendors, including those activities currently being performed by 
military personnel. Most DoD organizations have not moved aggressively to transfer 
functions to the private sector. Nevertheless, DoD can point to several successful 
examples of outsourcing. 
There have been some elements of successful outsourcing within DoD. Examples 
include the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) efforts to reduce wholesale inventories 
through a strategy of direct vendor delivery (DVD) of consumable materials. With the 
DVD process, a private sector vendor is contracted to deliver consumables of all types, 
from pharmaceuticals to office supplies, directly to the end user. The DLA has been able 
to reduce its inventory of over $1 0 billion and eliminate warehouse and distribution 
facilities while significantly reducing delivery times. The DVD process has been further 
streamlined by prime vendor contracts. With a prime vendor contract, the end user orders 
directly from the vendor and the item is delivered usually within 24 hours. 
Contractor personnel have provided many support services to military units in-
theater during every military deployment since the Vietnam conflict. The services 
provided include a wide range of logistics, logistic support, administrative, and other 
support services. The contractor support has been both responsive and effective and no 
firm has refused to provide in-theater support during a military contingency. (Camm, 
1995). 
Outsourcing actions within Federal agencies is governed by Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 that requires the outsourcing activity to 
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conduct competition between the inhouse public service provider and private sector 
vendors. During the 1978-94 period, the DoD military services conducted 2,138 A-76 
actions. The public-private competitions resulted in about $1.5 billion annual savings, an 
average of 31 percent across all services. (Tighe, 1995). Outside vendors won about 52 
percent of the competitions accounting for approximately 64 percent of the total 
workload and 78 percent ($1.2 billion) of the total savings. 
The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) analyzed the results of more than 800 A-76 
competitions within the Navy and found that savings averaged over 30 percent overall, 
and nearly 40 percent when the studies were won by outside vendors. In contrast, the 
savings totaled only about 20 percent when the inhouse workforce was retained even 
with 54 percent being won by the inhouse entity. (Marcus, 1993). The CNA analysis 
indicated the Navy studies focused on very narrow functional areas involving few 
government employees. About half of the studies involved fewer than 10 employees, 
while less than 10 percent involved more than 55 workers. The data also indicated that 
savings were highest when private vendors took over functions traditionally performed 
by military personnel. In these cases the savings averaged nearly 50 percent of total cost. 
The study also found that transferring workload to outside vendors resulted in no 
significant quality problems. 
The Task Force members were in strong agreement that DoD should consolidate 
responsibility for all base support functions in a single contract for each installation. The 
approach would transfer responsibility to a qualified service contractor for providing 
integrated facility management services. The proposal would not only reduce service 
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costs from the traditional "stovepipe" method, but also would reduce oversight costs and 
raise the visibility of contractor performance to senior management levels. 
4. Primary Impediments 
The DSB Task Force identified several major impediments to DoD 
implementation of an aggressive outsourcing strategy. The impediments include statutory . 
restrictions and congressional micromanagement; a time consuming and complicated 
procurement process; policies within DoD to maintain certain "core" capabilities; and a 
fundamental DoD culture of resistance to change. In addition to these impediments, a 
previous statute provided base commanders with the sole authority to commission A-76 
cost studies at their installations. The statute contributed significantly to the dramatic 
decline in the number of A-76 studies completed in recent years. 
Acquisition reform has not yet addressed the lack of adequate expertise in service 
contracting possessed by DoD contracting officers. For this reason, service contracts in 
DoD tend to include detailed specifications on how to perform the service, vice 
performance specifications that encourage reengineering of processes to improve 
performance and lower costs. The procurement process in DoD fosters a formal and arms 
length, and sometimes adversarial relationship between vendors and contract oversight 
personnel. Private sector experience with complex service contracts suggests a more 
collaborative approach result in more effective contract management and vendor 
relations. 
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The procurement timeline is excessive for DoD service contracts, limiting the 
ability of the department to aggressively pursue outsourcing solutions. The average A-76 
study takes at least 24 months for a single function, and exceeds 48 months for a complex 
multiple function. 
Cost accounting systems in the federal sector are designed to support the 
government budget process and congressional reporting requirements. The accounting 
systems are inadequate when used to measure and control the true costs of performing a 
business function. The basic premise of competition is undermined by not being able to 
determine true costs when competing with the private sector. Accurate cost accounting 
information, including proper allocation of indirect and overhead costs, could be 
achieved by augmenting the existing process with Activity Based Costing (ABC) 
methods. In the private sector, ABC has become a widely used and highly effective tool 
for understanding and managing costs. 
The Task Force favors shifting more depot level maintenance and repair workload 
to the private sector. Decisions on repair work should be based solely on capability and 
reliability. Responsiveness and assurance should guide workload allocation decisions 
vice ownership of the maintenance organization. Core capabilities for some specialized 
workload (e.g. deactivation of nuclear propulsion systems) needs to be maintained 
inhouse, however the Task Force believes the residual capability should be significantly 
reduced from the present infrastructure. 
A history of remarkable achievement within DoD has resulted in an entrenched 
culture that is resistant to change. In addition, there are few incentives for the military 
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services to pursue an aggressive outsourcing program. Installation Commanders are not 
evaluated on their effectiveness in outsourcing, and feel obligated to protect the job 
security of their staff. The DoD culture requires the Installation Commander to focus on 
military readiness, placing emphasis on the need for reliable and effective support. This 
traditional orientation translates into a very strong preference for inhouse support 
organizations. Skepticism prevails even when it becomes apparent that outsourcing can 
result in more effective and efficient support. 
5. Proposed Strategy 
The DSB Task Force urged DoD to establish a goal of shifting $7 to $12 billion in 
outsourcing savings to modernization accounts by FY 2002. The task force based these 
estimates for savings on the assumption that one half to two thirds of the 640,000 FTEs 
performing CA work could be transferred to the private sector by FY2002. With a fully 
loaded man-year rate estimated at $70,000, and assuming 30 percent savings as noted by 
CNA, (Tighe, 1995) on only half of the available FTEs, a total of about $7 billion in 
savings would be realized. The Task Force believes that with a more aggressive 
outsourcing plan, DoD could achieve savings of 40 percent on two thirds of the available 
FTEs, realizing about $12 billion in savings. 
An aggressive strategy would be required to achieve the identified potential 
savings. Critical elements of the strategy would need to include the following: 
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Change presumption: DoD must abandon the more costly bias in favor of 
inhouse support. All support functions that can be performed effectively by the private 
sector should be outsourced. 
Reduce reliance on A-76: The Task force believes the A-76 process is a flawed 
procedure and discourages outsourcing. DoD should use business case analysis, not 
public-private competition as the primary outsourcing vehicle. The decision should be 
made to get out of the business of some support functions. Outsourcing should be 
extended to include military billets to maximize savings potential. 
Broad functions: The Department should focus outsourcing efforts on more large 
and complex business areas to provide vendors with a greater opportunity to apply 
innovative technologies and to maximize savings. 
Reform A-76: DoD should continue to expedite the competitive process and seek 
to make private-public competitions more equitable. 
Eliminate Impediments: Priority attention should be given to removal of 
institutional and statutory impediments to the outsourcing initiative. 
Develop implementation plan: A detailed implementation plan with aggressive 
goals and milestones should be developed. Senior DoD managers should be held 
accountable to achieving outsourcing objectives. 
6. Recommendations 




• A policy statement should be issued by the Secretary of Defense 
(SecDef) reiterating that the private sector is the preferred provider of 
commercial activity (CA) support services. 
• The Secretary should stress that all non-combat support services must 
be considered for outsourcing except those that are inherently 
governmental (IHG) and services for which no adequate private sector 
capability exists. 
• DoD officials should ensure military services retain savings from 
outsourcing for modernization. 
• Legislation necessary to remove impediments and support an 
aggressive outsourcing strategy should be made a top priority. 
b. Leadership 
• Senior DoD leadership must persuade the institution that it is 
committed to implementing an aggressive outsourcing strategy. 
• Strong top-down support for a fundamental shift in DoD business 
practices to overcome mid-level resistance to change. 
• Senior leadership must designate a champion for outsourcing at the 
Assistant Secretary level or higher. 
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• DoD and Service components must establish and communicate 
clear expectations and milestones for subordinates. Senior managers 
must be held accountable for meeting goals. 
• DoD leadership must work with the Congress to eliminate 
statutory impediments to aggressive outsourcing. 
c. A-76 Process 
• Take full advantage of the A-76 waiver authority to avoid formal 
public-private competitions. Make the decision to "get out of the 
business" when necessary. 
• Continue to seek revision to the A -7 6 process to reduce complexity, 
improve timelines, and be advisory vice mandatory. Model the 
outsourcing process after the private sector's make versus buy decision 
making-process. 
• Identify and employ "best practices" to expedite the A-76 process. 
• Employ ABC analyses of DoD activities involved in public-private 
competitive sourcing to ensure proper identification and allocation of 
all overhead and indirect costs. 
64 
d. Contracting 
• Expand the DoD acquisition reform initiative to include service 
contracting improvements. Deploy a "tiger team" to develop near-term 
plan. 
• Service contracts should employ output oriented performance 
incentives to align the interests of both parties. 
• Develop a collaborative relationship with private service providers. 
Minimize contractor oversight personnel. 
• Service contracts should be long term partnerships, but have effective 
cancellation clauses. 
e. Personnel 
• Openly communicate intentions early and frequently. 
• Seek early involvement of employee and labor organizations. 
• Minimize involuntary separation by downsizing through attrition 
where possible. 
• Provide retraining, outplacement, and severance packages consistent 
with industry practices. 
• DoD leadership must be focused on the transition process and ensure 
displaced staff are treated fairly. 
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jf. ~o~istics 
• Base depot-level repair decisions on capability, reliability, and 
responsiveness. 
• Eliminate or redefine "core" logistics concepts to allow reliable 
contractors to perform. 
• Logistic support for new systems should be contractor provided. 
• Continue the ban on public-private competitions for depot work and 
work with congress to eliminate the 60/40 rule. 
• Outsource weapon system sustaining engineering work. 
• A void privatization in place approach unless it is the only practical 
solution and then ensure commercial work can be brought in. 
• Expand prime vendor and direct vendor delivery initiatives to service 
supply systems. 
g. Defense A~encies 
• Outsource Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) operations, 
continental United States (CONUS) Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA), CONUS defense finance and accounting (DF AS) 
accounting and payroll operations, transportation of household goods 
(HHG) and relocation services. 
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• Expand training and education outsourcing initiative. Focus on 
elimination of high cost military FTEs. 
• Expand outsourcing initiative for medical services. 
• Allow services to compete Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF) 
services against the private sector. 
h. Installation Support 
• The Task force recommends transferring responsibility for most base 
support activities to private contractors. 
• Adopt a new framework for installation support based on positive 
experience in the private sector with integrated facility management 
(IFM). 
• Establish a pilot program to outsource all support functions to a single 
contractor at two or more major installations in each service by the end 
of FY 1997. The contract should be best value competition and output 
oriented with performance incentives for five years. 
• Gradually privatize all military housing and concurrently increase 
housing allowances to offset the burden ofliving on the economy. 
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i. Other Contracting Opportunities 
• Use business case analyses approach to identify those services that 
could be transferred immediately to the private sector at lower costs 
with superior quality. 
• Senior DoD leadership should make the necessary top-down policy 
decision to reengineer operations and "get out of the business" of 
performing support functions that are performed by the private sector 
more efficiently. 
E. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was established by the Department of 
Defense Fiscal Year 1997 Authorization Act. The law contains a subsection entitled 
"Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996," originally sponsored as an amendment 
by Senator Lieberman (D-Conn.), establishing the QDR process to examine DoD 
strategy, force structure, modernization and infrastructure once every four years. 
Congress, dissatisfied with the slow pace of reform in the DoD by the executive branch, 
hoped to accelerate the restructuring of the department with the QDR. 
1. Modernization 
The focus of the QDR was to build a solid financial foundation that would 
support the future warfighting capabilities described by Joint Vision 2010. One important 
assumption made by the QDR was that national defense authorizations would remain 
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constant at 1997 levels of about $250 billion. The assumption was rather optimistic given 
the deficit reduction targets at the time. However, by projecting a relatively stable budget, 
the QDR could concentrate on internal reforms to support the modernization of weapons 
systems. 
Modernization had been slowed in the years following the Cold War as 
procurement accounts were disproportionately reduced and the funds reprogrammed to 
other support accounts. The decision to reduce the procurement accounts was a 
calculated risk supporting the defense drawdown initiated during the Bush 
administration. The risk seemed prudent as DoD had procured large numbers of modern 
weapons during the early 1980's and was retiring older weapon systems during the 
drawdown. However, the drawdown was now effectively over and the dividend from 
reducing procurement was exhausted. The QDR declared the "procurement holiday" 
must end. Maintaining technical superiority would require increasing the procurement 
accounts from $42.6 billion to roughly $60 billion by FY-2001. (BENS, 1997). 
2. Force Structure 
Another significant assumption made by the QDR was to maintain the status quo 
threat scenario assumed earlier by the BUR. Military force structure would continue to be 
based on the requirement to support two major regional conflicts (MRC) almost 
simultaneously. Maintaining the two MRC threat scenario would result in very little 
military service department force structure change. 
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The Army would maintain 10 active duty divisions. Army Reserve and National 
Guard would be reduced by 45,000, civilians would be reduced by 33,700, and active 
duty personnel reduced by 15,000 through deactivation, consolidation, and realignment 
of headquarters and facilities. 
The Navy would maintain 12 carrier battle groups and 12 amphibious assault 
ready groups. Surface combatants would be reduced from 128 to 116 while the fast-
attack submarine fleet would be reduced from 73 to 50 boats. Personnel reductions would 
include 18,000 active duty, 8400 civilians and 4100 reservists. 
The Air Force would maintain 20 fighter wings but transfer one of the 13 active 
wings to the reserves. Bombers would be reduced from 202 to 187. These reductions and 
some additional realignment would result in personnel reductions of27,000 active duty, 
700 reserves and 18,300 civilians. 
The Marine Corps would maintain all three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF). 
Slight personnel reductions through realignment would result in 1,800 active duty, 400 
civilians and 4,200 reserves being cut. 
Total DoD personnel reductions projected by the QDR were about 60,000 (4.2 
percent) active duty, 55,000 (6.2 percent) reservists, and 80,000 (11.1 percent) civilians. 
Of the 140,000 total active duty and civilian personnel reductions, 109,000 (78 percent) 
were planned to come from infrastructure support reductions. Infrastructure support was 
clearly targeted as the modernization bill payer. A significant portion of the reductions 
was expected from two new rounds ofbase closure and realignment (BRAC). The new 
BRAC actions have yet to be authorized by congress. 
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3. Infrastructure 
Infrastructure support was defined by the QDR as the organizations and activities 
conducted by installations for the operating forces, training programs for military 
personnel, logistics support, central personnel services, and headquarters functions. The 
QDR identified that 48 percent of the total military and civilian personnel employed by 
DoD are engaged in infrastructure support functions. In addition, when medical services, 
science and technology programs, and central command, control and communications 
functions are included the number expands to 61 percent of total DoD personnel. 
The QDR placed considerable attention on operation of the defense infrastructure. 
Much of the emphasis was due to the similarities between DoD infrastructure and private 
sector business practices. Business operations in the private sector have undergone 
transformational change in recent times. Lessons learned from the private sector are 
expected to be directly transferable to DoD infrastructure operations. 
One QDR initiative called for improving the efficiency and performance ofDoD 
support activities by adopting innovative management and business practices from the 
private sector. Included in the innovative initiatives was "reengineering" or "reinventing" 
support functions. The report characterized reengineering as streamlining, reorganizing, 
downsizing, consolidating, computerizing, and commercializing operations. 
Another example cited as a critical part of reengineering is outsourcing of non-
warfighting support functions. Outsourcing was presented in terms of competition 
between the private and public sectors for providing support functions. Outsourcing is 
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expected to provide tighter focus on core tasks, better service quality, more 
responsiveness and agility, better access to new technologies, and lower costs. 
The QDR also identified significant remaining excess base structure, enough to 
support two additional BRAC rounds. The active duty end strength would be reduced by 
36 percent by FY 2003, yet domestic facilities would be reduced by only 21 percent 
without additional BRAC rounds. The report acknowledged that costs are significant up-
front, however long term savings are substantial. The recommendation was that future 
BRAC should also include laboratories and test ranges that support research, test, and 
evaluation in addition to bases. 
F. DEFENSE REFORM INITIATIVE 
The QDR examined the national security threats, risks, and opportunities facing 
the country today through 2015. A new national defense strategy was developed from 
this analysis. Implementing the strategy requires a balance between the demands of 
present postures with the imperative to invest in the future. The balance between 
requirements can be achieved only if resources are reallocated from overhead and support 
functions to the fighting forces. (Cohen, 1997) 
The conceptual framework for how our forces will fight in the future is described 
in Joint vision 2010 as full spectrum dominance. This "Revolution in Military Affairs" 
(RMA) promises to enable our forces to attack throughout the battlefield with great 
precision and few munitions, and to better protect themselves. The transformation of the 
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forces is achievable, but dependent on our ability to shift resources from overhead and 
support functions by bringing about a "Revolution in Business Affairs" (RBA). 
The Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) strives to achieve the RBA. The reforms 
identified have been guided by the following principles: 
• Focus the enterprise on a unifying vision. 
• Commit the leadership team to change. 
• Focus on core competencies. 
• Streamline organizations for agility. 
• Invest in people. 
• Exploit information technology. 
• Breakdown barriers between organizations. 
The DRI applies the guiding principles to define initiatives in the following four 
areas: (GAO/NSIAD-99-87, 1999). 
Reengineer: Adopt modem business practices to achieve world-class standards 
of performance. 
Consolidate: Streamline organizations to remove redundancy and maximize 
synergy. 
Compete: Apply market mechanisms to improve quality, reduce costs, and 
respond to customer needs. 
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Eliminate: reduce excess support structures to free resources and focus on core 
competencies. 
1. Reengineer By Adopting Best Business Practices 
The DoD is adopting many of the lessons learned by the private sector over the 
past decade. These best business and management practices have made American 
business a world leader and increased productivity to an all time high. Many of the 
proposed business process reengineering initiatives must overcome significant challenges 
if they are to be implemented in a timely, efficient, and effective manner. (GAO/T-
NSIAD/ AIMD-98-122, 1998). 
a. Electronic Business Operations 
Electronic technologies including the Internet and the World Wide Web 
will allow DoD to eliminate a significant amount of paperwork processing. DoD business 
processes will become more efficient by reducing the amount of paper processed. Use of 
electronic funds transfer (EFT) for contract payment will also allow DoD to realize gains 
in efficiency. 
Considerable savings in both cost and delivery time is being achieved by 
the use of the government-wide purchase card. The government purchase card is 
equivalent to a Visa commercial credit card and is widely accepted. By using the 
government purchase card for transactions between organizations, inventory levels can 
also be reduced. 
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Electronic commerce will also be expanded to allow Internet direct 
purchases. The efficiency of small item purchases will be improved dramatically by 
allowing the end user to make the transaction directly. The DoD is establishing electronic 
shopping malls to support one stop shopping that will also utilize the government 
purchase card for payment. 
By making technical data available electronically, DoD is moving towards· 
paper-free weapons system support. Many other publications, reports and directives are 
being made available either electronically or by CD-ROM supporting the reduction of 
paper and increasing efficiency throughout the department. 
b. Prime Vendor Contracting 
In the past, the procurement strategy within DoD was to procure huge 
stocks of material and commodities. The items would be stored in DoD warehouses and 
invariably not all would be used by the expiration dates. Considerable costs were 
incurred by DoD for initial procurement, storage, handling, and spoilage resulting in 
significant inefficiencies. Today a different concept called prime vendor delivery is being 
used to improve both procurement efficiency and delivery time. Prime vendor is based on 
a negotiated contract with a single vendor who supplies to all DoD customers within a 
geographical area. The vendor is responsible for all distribution and warehousing 
requirements and delivery to the end user. This process has greatly improved delivery 
time while reducing overall costs. 
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c. Consolidating Logistics and Transportation 
Just in time logistics is revolutionizing the DoD just as it did to American 
·business. Delivery of needed material to forward-deployed warfighters is of critical 
concern. The DoD has committed to provide total visibility of all equipment, supplies, 
and spare parts by the use of modern inventory management systems. A new 
transportation management system is expected to enhance visibility and permit greater 
efficiency in transportation. (GAO/NSIAD-00-7, 1999) These initiatives will build 
confidence in the deployed force that smaller inventories will meet critical needs. 
d. Travel Reengineering 
The system will be revamped and the old rules simplified. The time 
required to process a travel claim has been reduced by 65 percent. The new paperless 
process is expected save hundreds of millions of dollars annually. 
e. Household Goods Transportation 
Over 800,000 household moves annually are paid for by DoD, more than 
any corporation in the country. Of all the moves, 25 percent end up with damage claims 
filed as compared to about 10 percent in the private sector. The poor performance is a 
direct resuit of our "lowest bidder" contracting system. We must do better for our people. 
Two initiatives will help achieve improvement goals. 
First, reimbursement rates for military members that chose the Do It 
Yourself (DITY) option will be raised from 80 percent of government costs to 95 percent. 
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Secondly, service members will be allowed to select from a list oflocal carriers instead 
of being assigned a carrier based on a rotating list. 
2. Consolidate Pentagon Organization 
In alignment with reengineering efforts, the headquarters element should be 
focused on corporate level tasks. Consequently, corporate level organizations within the 
Office of the Secretary ofDefense (OSD) and the service Headquarters must be reduced 
and flattened (Mcinerney, 1998). In addition, Congress directed DoD to reduce all 
headquarters activities 25 percent from FY 1997 levels by the end of FY 2002. 
(GAO/NSIAD-99-45, 1999). The following DRI goals will allow the organizations to 
focus on core activities: 
• Reduce OSD by 33 percent from FY 1996levels. 
• Reduce DoD field activities and operating organizations reporting to OSD by 
36 percent. 
• Reduce the Joint Staff and associated personnel by 29 percent by the end of 
FY2003. 
• Reduce Defense Agency personnel by 21 percent over five years. 
• Reduce Headquarters elements of the Military Departments and major 
commands by 10 percent by the end ofFY 2003 
• Reduce the Headquarters of Combatant Commands (CINC's) by 7 percent by 
the end ofFY 2003. 
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3. Streamlining Through Competition 
Competition forces organizations to improve quality, reduce costs, and focus on 
customer requirements. American corporations are world leaders in cost performance, 
innovation and technology development because of the competition of global markets. 
Much of the support services performed within DoD are identical to those in the private 
sector. 
Competition between private and public sectors is not new. The DoD has 
conducted many competitions in the past that generally resulted in savings of 20 percent 
or more. Many state and local governments have also learned that competition improves 
quality and reduces costs. The intent is not to replace the government worker with private 
sector contractors, just to obtain the best service at the best price. The Future Year 
Defense Plan (FYDP) projects savings from A-76 competitions as $6.2 billion between 
FY 1997 and FY 2003. (GAO/NSIAD-99-66, 1999). 
a. Competition for Commercial Activities Using A-76 
Competitions for commercial activity (CA) work between the private and 
public sector are conducted in accordance with Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) circular A-76. To ensure competitions are conducted fairly, A-76 provides 
procedures to compare the inhouse most efficient organization (MEO) with private sector 
bids. 
Between 1979 and 1994 DoD conducted over 2000 competitions under the 
A-76 requirements. About half of the competitions were won by the private sector and 
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halfby the inhouse workforces. Regardless of who won, annual operating costs were 
reduced by about 31 percent for a cumulative total savings of over $1.5 billion a year. 
Conducting competition studies may require the use of support contractors, as existing 
inhouse expertise is less than in the past. (GAO/NSIAD-99-46, 1999) 
The DoD intends to significantly increase the number of functions 
competed under A-76. Over the next five years, approximately 150,000 FTE's,will be 
competed in a variety of commercial activities. Savings are expected to be a sustained 
$2.5 billion after the competitions are completed. 
Classification of commercial activities must be improved and 
standardized. The DoD will review all functions performed by military and civilian 
personnel and identify which are inherently governmental (IHG) and which are 
commercial (CA) in nature. Functional reviews will likely lead to additional FTE 
competitions beyond what is currently planned. 
b. Competition for Depot Maintenance 
Competitions generate positive incentives for cost reductions. The DoD 
will always need some amount of organic depot repair capability to meet core 
warfighting requirements. A careful case by case evaluation should be conducted for 
depot work available for competition. 
Depot maintenance work is largely excluded from A-76 competitions by 
statute. The DoD will continue to pursue public-private competitions to the extent 
allowable by law. Competitions for depot work can save the taxpayers millions of dollars. 
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4. Eliminating Unneeded Infrastructure 
An important attribute contributing in the rise of American business to world 
leadership has been their efforts to divest of unneeded and out of date infrastructure. The 
DoD is encumbered with excess facilities. These facilities drain resources that could 
otherwise be spent on modernization. An integral part of the reform strategy is to 
eliminate unneeded infrastructure. 
a. Base Closure 
Infrastructure reductions have lagged behind force structure drawdowns. 
The force structure will have reduced by 36 percent by the end ofFY 2003 yet domestic 
base structure will have been reduced by only 21 percent. Even after four rounds of Base 
Closure and Realignment (BRAC) have been completed, excess base structure consumes 
significant resources for annual operation and maintenance that could be used for 
modernization. (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115, 1998) 
The previous four rounds ofBRAC will yield sustained annual savings of 
$5.5 billion beginning in FY 2001. The DoD invested $23 billion to close or realign 152 
major and 235 smaller installations. Yet, DoD still operates facilities that it no longer 
needs and cannot afford. (GAO/NSIAD-99-36, 1998) 
The QDR found that there are enough excess facilities to warrant two 
additional rounds ofBRAC. The DoD will seek congressional approval for these two 
rounds. 
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b. Consolidation, Restructuring, and Regionalization 
It is more costly to operate several smaller facilities that could be 
consolidated into a few larger ones. Several prime candidates for consolidation include 
the Defense Information System Agency (DISA), Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service (DF AS), laboratories and test and evaluation facilities. 
Areas of high installation concentration will consider regional 
consolidation opportunities. Sharing infrastructure across commands, bases and services 
can generate significant savings. (GAO/HR-97-7, 1997). 
Demolition of excess buildings that are no longer needed is an essential 
element of the reduction strategy. The DoD has already identified 8,000 and 50 million 
square feet of excess facilities that will be demolished. 
c. Revitalizing Housing and Utilities with Private Sector Capital 
New tools have been authorized by Congress that allows leveraging 
private sector capital for military family housing and base utility systems. The DoD can 
now convey title to military housing and utility systems to the private sector who can 
then invest their own resources to provide better services. 
About two thirds of all military families already reside in the private 
sector housing at a cost of about $8 billion annually. (GAO/NSIAD-00-71, 2000). The 
other one third lives in 300,000 government owned housing units. About 200,000 of 
these units are below acceptable standards because ofyears of neglect. With the 
traditional methods of repair and replacement, and the projected housing budgets, it 
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would take 30 years and $20 billion to bring these housing units up to standards. With the 
new authorities, DoD will seek to eliminate all inadequate housing by 2010, much more 
quickly than otherwise possible. 
Utility systems on DoD installations provide water, electricity, steam, and 
sewer necessary for installation operation. Many of these systems are old and in need of 
repair. The funding required to repair these systems far exceeds what is available. The 
DoD will seek to transfer ownership of these systems to local utilities and other entities 
that do have the resources and the expertise to operate the systems. 
The procurement of energy commodities is also targeted for improvement. 
Energy is a regional commodity. Because of different service channels, installations in 
the same region but in different service channels have not been able to consolidate 
procurements in the past. The DoD will consolidate energy purchase contracts under the 
Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) to maximize savings. 
G. NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL 
The Military force Structure Act of 1996 required the convening of a National 
Defense Panel (NDP) to report on the significant issues facing DoD as it transitions into 
the 21st century. The panel drew from experts on defense and national security from 
within the DoD, other government agencies and the private sector. The panel evaluated 
the future operational environment from 2010 to 2020 against the force capabilities 
necessary to meet defense challenges of the future. (Odeen, 1997). 
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The NDP viewed fundamental reform of the DoD support infrastructure as a 
critical element necessary to support a successful transformation strategy for 2010-2020. 
The report noted that DoD infrastructure of today was unaffordable and that meaningful 
reform was not possible unless DoD embraced a more effective business-like approach. 
Excessive costs to maintain the expansive Cold War era infrastructure divert resources 
from modernization. The DoD expends 60 percent of their total budget authority for 
infrastructure support. (Ackerman, 1997). Transformational change can only be achieved 
if DoD and the military departments are willing to consider dramatic changes to leverage 
innovative business practices and technology. The NDP believes a new paradigm is 
needed for infrastructure management that contains the following elements: 
Cost visibility and Accuracy: Cost information is imperative to support 
improvement in resource allocation. Decision-makers must have systems that make costs 
visible. Financial systems that accurately reflect costs and supports management 
visibility for improvement decisions should become a priority. One tool for improving 
cost accounting is ABC. Modeling by ABC methods is gaining acceptance for cost 
determination in A-76 competition studies. (GAO/NSIAD-99-152, 1999). 
Positive Incentives: The DoD must ensure that part of the savings realized from 
streamlining efforts is retained by the local organization for its own use. Projected 
savings should not be removed before improvements are fully implemented. The panel 
also recommended that DoD accelerate deployment of new financial management 
systems with strong ABC capabilities. 
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Choice and Competition: The ability to develop innovative solutions to 
customers needs is enhanced by competition and choice Competitively sourcing support 
services is essential to force improved service quality and lower costs. 
Resource flexibility: The flexibility of DoD management is severally restricted 
by the inability to shift funds between accounts because of "color of Money" restrictions. 
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) has evolved into a rigid and 
endless process that is detrimental to strategic planning and effective business 
management. Increased flexibility in resource allocation would encourage innovation and 
process improvement. (BENS, 2000). 
Civil and Military Integration: Local communities should become the preferred 
providers of support services. The DoD should revise the long-standing policy of military 
base self-sufficiency and integrate into the local community. The NDP recommended 
DoD reconsider the traditional and paternalistic concept of a military base providing on-
base housing, health care, entertainment, education, commissaries, and other support 
functions. Military personnel should receive additional compensation rather than on-base 
support services. 
Installation and Facility Consolidation: Excess military base infrastructure 
needs to be reduced. The panel strongly urged both the Congress and DoD to conduct 
additional Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) actions. In addition, the panel noted 
that DoD maintains significant duplication of facility capability across military 
departments and recommended that DoD move toward joint installations. 
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H. DON REVOLUTION OF BUSINESS AFFAIRS 
Over the past decade, the private sector has successfully transformed their 
business practices in response to increasing global competition. The Department of the 
Navy (DoN) views these changes as revolutionary and hopes to capture some of the same 
innovation to dramatically improve Navy business functions that are very similar. The 
DoN has termed their change initiative the "Revolution in Business Affairs" (RBA). 
According to a report from the Naval Studies Board (NSB), DoN expects the RBA will 
achieve between $3.5 and $5.0 billion in annual savings for modernization. (NSB, 1998). 
The Secretary of the Navy (SecNav), along with the Commandant ofthe Marine Corps 
(CMC), and the Chief of Naval Operations, (CNO) have provided the department with a 
business vision and goals. (Danzig, 1998). The DoN leadership believes business process 
improvements will lead to resource savings that can be applied to operational needs and 
requirements. The strategic business vision is: 
The department of the Navy will continue to provide the dominant global 
naval force and develop future capabilities to safeguard the nation. The 
department will recruit, engage, and retain the best people in military and 
civilian service; deliver recognizable values for every dollar spent; and 
create a business environment focused on teamwork and outcomes. 
The strategic business goals include: 
• Foster continued conceptual, technological, and operational superiority. 
Develop business programs to leveraging innovative technology and 
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operational concepts. Align acquisition processes to take advantage of 
information and technology. 
• Recruit, engage, and retain the best people, both military and civilian. 
Recognize the value of people and develop a professional staff. Increase 
efficiency and reduce workload. Optimize and balance people resource 
training, recruiting, and rewarding. Increase personnel management 
flexibility. Support learning and professional development. 
• Deliver recognizable value for every dollar pent. Develop decision support 
tools to enable informed decision making. Improve decision support systems 
visibility, accountability and connectivity. 
• Create a business environment focused on teamwork and outcomes. Reduce 
bureaucracy by moving beyond "stovepipes" to integrated organizations. 
Adopt best business practices for providing services. 
I. REFORM INITIATIVES IMPACTING INSTALLATIONS 
The DRI is by far the major reform initiative that will have the greatest impact the 
installations are operated in the DoD. Each of the four focus areas of the DRI will change 
the way business functions are executed at installations. 
Reengineering of DoD wide business processes by adopting modern business 
practices that will achieve world-class standards of performance. Use of electronic funds 
transfer (EFT) for contract payment, service contract awards, and the use of the 
government-wide purchase card are already being implemented at the installation level. 
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In addition, reengineering of installation specific functions will also lead to improved 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
Installations will also be actively involved in streamlining organizations by 
consolidating to remove redundancy and maximize synergy. Many of the other initiatives 
will cause a need for restructuring installation organizations. 
Competitions for commercial activity (CA) work between the private and public 
sector conducted in accordance with Office ofManagement and Budget (OMB) circular 
A-76 will be the primary method of reform at installations. The DoD intends to 
significantly increase the number of functions competed under A-76. Most CA functions 
are conducted at installations. Over the next five years, approximately 150,000 FTE's will 
be competed in a variety of commercial activities. 
An important attribute contributing in the rise of American business to world 
leadership has been their efforts to divest of unneeded and out of date infrastructure. The 
DoD is encumbered with excess facilities. These facilities drain resources that could 
otherwise be spent on modernization. An integral component of the installation reform 
strategy will be to consolidate infrastructure use in high concentration areas and to 
eliminate unneeded infrastructure when possible. 
Themost predominate tools of the RBA applied to installations will be 
competitive sourcing, regionalization, privatization, and business process reengineering. 
Each of these initiatives will have a significant impact on installation operations over the 
next several years. 
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1. Competitive Sourcing 
If extensive savings are to be achieved, DoD must abandon its traditional reliance 
on in-house support organizations and support a new paradigm that capitalizes on the 
efficiency and creativity of the private sector. Competitions for commercial activity (CA) 
work between the private and public sector conducted in accordance with Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) circular A-76 will be the primary means of business 
reform at installations. To ensure competitions are conducted fairly, A-76 provides 
procedures to compare the inhouse most efficient organization (MEO) with private sector 
bids. Competitive sourcing of broad functional areas rather than single functions or a 
group of tasks leads to greater synergy and decreased contract management and 
oversight. Contracting an entire functional area also leads to greater control and 
accountability. 
Competitive sourcing is expected to provide tighter focus on core tasks, better 
service quality, more responsiveness and agility, better access to new technologies, and 
lower costs. Regardless of who wins the competition, annual operating costs are expected 
to be reduced by about 30 percent. 
The DoD intends to significantly increase the number of functions competed 
under A-76. Over the next few years, approximately 150,000 FTE's will be competed in a 
variety of commercial activities. Savings are expected to be a sustained $2.5 billion after 
the competitions are completed. 
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Classification of commercial activities must be improved and standardized. The 
DoD will review all functions performed by military and civilian personnel and identify 
which are inherently governmental (IHG) and which are commercial (CA) in nature. 
Functional reviews will likely lead to additional FTE competitions beyond what is 
currently planned. 
2. Regionalization 
The DoD infrastructure is unaffordable and meaningful reform not possible unless 
DoD embraces a more effective business-like approach. Excessive costs to maintain the 
expansive Cold War era infrastructure divert resources from modernization. The NDP 
noted that DoD maintains significant duplication of facility capability across military 
departments and recommended that DoD move toward joint installations. 
Transformational change can only be achieved if DoD and the military departments are 
willing to consider dramatic changes to leverage innovative business practices and 
technology a new paradigm is needed for infrastructure management. It is more costly to 
operate several smaller facilities that could be consolidated into a few larger ones. Areas 
ofhigh installation concentration will consider regional consolidation opportunities. 




Privatization initiatives for family housing will impact installations. New tools 
have been authorized by Congress that allows leveraging private sector capital for 
military family housing and base utility systems. The DoD can now convey title or 
"privatize" government owned military housing and utility systems to the private sector. 
The new titleholder can then invest their own resources, and leverage capital through 
loans to improve the facilities and provide better services. 
One third of military families live in 300,000 government owned housing units. 
About 200,000 of these units are below acceptable standards because of years of 
maintenance neglect. With the traditional methods of repair and replacement, and the 
projected housing budgets, it would take 30 years and $20 billion to bring these housing 
units up to standards. With the new authorities, DoD will seek to eliminate all inadequate 
housing by 2010, much more quickly than otherwise possible. 
Utility systems on DoD installations provide water, electricity, steam, and sewer 
necessary for installation operation. Many of these systems are old and in need of repair. 
The funding required to repair these systems far exceeds what is available. The DoD will 
seek to transfer ownership of these systems to local utilities and other entities that do 
have the resources and the expertise to operate the systems. 
4. Business Process Reengineering 
One QDR initiative called for improving the efficiency and performance of DoD 
support activities by adopting innovative management and business practices from the 
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private sector. Included in the innovative initiatives was "reengineering" or "reinventing" 
support functions. Many of the support functions are indigenous to installation 
operations. Reengineering can be characterized as streamlining, reorganizing, 
downsizing, consolidating, computerizing, and commercializing of operations. 
Reengineering of DoD wide business processes by adopting modem business 
practices that will achieve world-class standards of performance. Use of electronic funds 
transfer (EFT) for contract payment, service contract awards, and the use of the 
government-wide purchase card are already being implemented at the installation level. 
In addition, reengineering of installation specific functions will also lead to improved 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
The RBA advocates local communities becoming the preferred providers of 
support services. DoD will be revising the long-standing policy of military installation 
self-sufficiency and integrating into the local community. The transition will require a 
major reengineering effort at installations. 
Competitive sourcing efforts will also generate a need to reengineer installation 
support functions. Separation ofCA and IHG, realignment of military career path 
positions, and new contract oversight responsibilities will also require organization 
reengineering. 
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IV. MARINE CORPS INSTALLATION AS A SYSTEM UNDER REFORM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the affect major business reform initiatives initiated by 
DoD are having on Marine Corps installation management practices. Marine Corps 
installations are represented as an organizational system operating in a larger external 
environmental context partly created by the DoD business reform initiatives. 
Organizational elements are discussed using the Organizational Systems Framework 
model introduced in Chapter II and illustrated by figure 2-5. (Roberts, 2000). 
The revolution in business affairs (RBA) is expected to "transform" the way 
Marine Corps installations are managed. Better business practices are expected to emerge 
as the tools of the RBA are applied. These tools include efficiency and effectiveness 
gains through competitive sourcing of goods and services, process reengineering, 
outsourcing and privatizing functions that are currently done in-house, as well as 
regionalizing like functions. "Revolutions are not easy. They require hard work and 
creative thinking, however, the resulting transformation is expected to pay big 
dividends." (Krolak, 1998). 
A revolution implies significant changes from the way installations are operated 
today. The degree of expected change is not just incremental, but transformational. The 
organizational leaders of Marine Corps installations must continue to operate and provide 
all the support services they now provide while executing major business reform 
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initiatives. These organizational leaders are expected to successfully lead the 
fundamental change effort transforming installation business practices. 
Installation functional communities tend to resist any change within their area of 
influence. Significant changes in how installations will be operated appear to be 
unavoidable. Are these organizational stovepipes prepared to change? Do our base 
operation leaders posses the requisite skills? Are the leaders adequately prepared to be 
successful in this transformation? These questions and others will need to be addressed as 
part of the revolutionary change in business affairs. If installation leaders are not 
adequately prepared, and therefore, must endure failure before success, the process will 
be painful, very painful indeed. 
B. ENVIRONMENT/CONTEXT 
Environment refers to the larger external environment. Marine Corps installations 
co-exist within the larger environment ofDoD. The external environment influences the 
organization through the actions of people, social and political factors, technological and 
economic forces, and legal constraints. The environment often makes demands on the 
organization and imposes constraints on the organization's actions. At the same time, the 
environment offers opportunities for the organization to succeed. 
In addition to the external environment, the context means resources and history 
of the organization. Resources include both tangible and intangible assets. Tangible 
assets are the employees, capital, technology and information that an organization 
contains. Perception of the organization and organizational culture are examples of 
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intangible assets. The history of an organization greatly influences the way it functions in 
the present. Past behavior of key leaders, response to past crises, and evolution of values 
all contribute to how an organization will act. 
1. Political 
The major political parties in the United States have consistently agreed on 
considerable reductions in the DoD budget from the recent peak in the mid 1980's. With 
the end of the Cold War came the expectation for a peace dividend. The American public 
and the Congress believe a smaller military force and reduced DoD budgets should result 
from the demise of the Soviet threat. The United States dominates the world as never 
before. 
2. Economic 
Mandatory spending on interest and entitlements will have grown from 22.7 
percent to 72 percent of the Federal budget over the forty years from 1963 to 2003. For a 
quarter century, the annual expenditures of our Federal government have exceeded the 
available revenues. The resulting deficit spending has led to a cumulative federal debt of 
over $5.6 trillion by 1999. Just the amount of interest payments required each year results 
in 12 percent of the total annual budget. 
Eliminating the federal budget deficit and reducing the growth of national debt 
has become a priority within the government. Fiscal policy is as much a reason for 
reducing the costs of DoD as the end of the Cold War. With the aging of the baby boomer 
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generation, entitlement spending for Medicare and social security will continue to grow 
at an alarming rate. For these reasons, DoD and the Marine Corps must find ways to 
reduce costs. 
3. Social 
Some would argue that a smaller force is justified because there is no viable 
major military threat on the horizon for at least the next 15 years. Our troops already 
have the most advanced equipment of any nation in the world and our defense spending 
accounts for one-third of the entire world's defense outlays. Others point to the escalating 
entitlement spending on Medicare and Social Security as a more tangible and immediate 
reason for reducing defense expenditures. 
4. Technological 
The United States is at a technological transition point, moving into a new era 
when a nations ability to wage war is far more dependent on real time information than in 
the past. The move into an information age has significant consequences on the DoD and 
USMC military capabilities. Many experts believe we are entering a period of a 
"Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA). The Marine Corps and DoD are engaged in 
transformational change to support the RMA needs at the same time that fiscal reality is 
demanding reduced budgets. Clearly, the resources to support the RMA transformation 
must come from elsewhere within the DoD. A Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) has 
evolved to redefine business functions and performance in order to increase efficiency 
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while maintaining the effectiveness of support functions. The RBA is expected to yield 
resources necessary to reinvest in the RMA transformation. 
C. KEY SUCCESS FACTORS 
Key success factors are the critical indicators against which an organization must 
demonstrate at least adequate performance if it is to prosper. The specifkfactorswill 
differ for each organization. What does it take for a Marine Corps installation as an 
organizational system to be successful in implementing DoD business reform initiatives? 
The Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics (DC I&L) articulates in 
the Installation Campaign Plan that an austere funding environment will require changes 
in the way installations are managed in the future. Installation leadership will need to find 
ways to reduce costs, minimize military personnel structure, leverage the latest 
technological advances, and incorporate innovative processes and better business 
practices from the private sector including competitive sourcing. (Mckissack, 2000) 
D. SYSTEM DIRECTION 
Direction setting and design factors are the two points where management can 
directly intervene in order to cause change in the organizational system. System direction 
is a management process that converts input to the organization from the external 
environment (including higher authority) into "steering" or "guiding" direction for the 
entire organization to follow. Setting overall system direction is accomplished by 
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establishing and communicating the critical attributes that include mandates, values, 
mission, strategic issues, vision, goals, and strategy. 
1. Mandate 
Mandates are both formal and informal requirements on what to do (and not do) 
from external authorities. Formal mandates for business process reform are provided to 
Marine Corps installations by DoD and HQMC direction. Informal mandates are 
embodied in cultural norms and values of the personnel affected. The DRI establishes 
formal mandates from DoD. The mandates include competitive sourcing of CA functions, 
regionalizing in high concentration areas, privatizing housing and utilities, and 
reengineering other installation processes. The Marine Corps Commandants guidance 
and Installation Campaign Plan elaborate on the DoD mandates and add an additional 
mandate of returning Marines to the operating forces. 
a. Competitive Sourcing 
The Marine Corps intends to significantly increase the number of 
functions competed under OMB circular A-76. Approximately 5,000 installation FTE's 
will be competed in a number of commercial activities over the next several years. A 
particular concern is the Marine Corps past performance in strategic sourcing has been 
limited, slow, and often ineffective. For strategic sourcing to be effective, the Marine 
Corps must improve their sourcing strategies and performance. (Moore, 1999). 
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Competitive sourcing is expected to provide tighter focus on core tasks, 
better service quality, more responsiveness and agility, better access to new technologies, 
and lower costs. Regardless of who wins the competition, annual operating costs are 
expected to be reduced by about 30 percent. 
The Marine Corps no longer retains sufficient internal expertise to 
independently execute the competitions and will need to procure contractor support. The 
estimated up front cost of competition is $8600 per FTE, offsetting any savings in the 
end. (GAO/NSIAD-99-46, 1999). 
b. Regionalization 
It is more costly to operate several smaller facilities that could be 
consolidated into a few larger ones. Areas of high installation concentration will consider 
regional consolidation opportunities. Sharing infrastructure across commands, bases and 
services can generate significant savings 
A regional approach will be necessary to solve mission critical shortfalls 
in the future. The Commandant ofthe Marine Corps states the Marine Corps should 
pursue and adopt opportunities to enhance operational and administrative interaction with 
the Navy. (Jones, 2000). Opportunities that leverage innovative business practices and 
technology are needed for installations to achieve transformational change. 
99 
c. Privatization 
In accordance with a DRI mandate the Marine Corps is seeking to transfer 
ownership of installation utility systems to local utilities and other entities. Many of these 
systems are old and in need of repair. The funding required to repair these systems far 
exceeds what is available. The privatization process being used is a two-phase approach. 
First, a request for interest (RFI) solicitation is issued. Second, a request for proposal 
(RFP) is issued to those entities that interest and have the capability to be successful. The 
DoN also requires an engineering evaluation of the system to determine the value prior to 
soliciting proposals. The process is cumbersome and time-consuming. 
The DoD mandate is to bring all military family housing up to meet 
standards for adequacy by 2010. The projected family housing budgets are insufficient to 
meet this goal using conventional methods, therefore alternatives must be considered. 
Military construction, housing allowances, and privatization each contribute to the family 
housing initiative, however each program is managed separately and there has not been a 
coordinated effort. (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115, 1998). 
Adequate family housing is a critical concern for Marines with families. 
Substantial military construction funds would be necessary to rebuild and refurbish the 
existing family housing inventory to meet standards for adequacy. The Marine Corps 
mandates construction and renovation projects for government quarters will pursue 
public-private ventures (PPV) where it makes sense. 
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Enlisted military personnel are more likely to be married and to have 
children than their civilian counterparts. (Cadigan, 2000). Government owned family 
housing costs about $5,000 per year more than private sector housing in the local 
community. A recent DoD initiative to increase basic allowance for housing (BAH) may 
reduce the overall need for government housing on Marine Corps installations if 
approved by Congress. 
d. Business Process Reengineering 
Many of the support functions are indigenous to installation operations. 
Reengineering can be characterized as streamlining, reorganizing, downsizing, 
consolidating, computerizing, and commercializing of operations. The RBA advocates 
local communities becoming the preferred providers of support services. The Marine 
Corps mandates that it will be revising the long-standing policy of installation self-
sufficiency and integrating into the local community. The transition will require a major 
reengineering effort at installations. 
Competitive sourcing efforts will also generate a need to reengineer 
installation support functions. Separation of CA and IHG, realignment of military career 




Values are typically part of an organizational philosophy of operations and help 
explain how an organization approaches its work, manage internal affairs, and relate to 
the external environment. Underlying organizational values drive decisions, particularly 
those decisions that determine future direction. The values of an organization are part of 
a belief system that determines behavioral norms. 
The traditional Marine Corps value system of "doing more with less" and "never 
say no" when asked to take on another mission or support a Marine are very much 
prevalent in installation operations. These values are coupled with the strong belief that 
any problem can be overcome by hard work and working harder. 
Organizationally, the Marine Corps values their people, both civilian and 
Marines, above all else. On a Marine Corps installation, the effectiveness of serving 
customers and other stakeholders is also valued. Providing services effectively and how 
to provide them more efficiently is an emerging value. 
The operating forces are the focal point of the Marine Corps. Installations and 
training activities are the supporting establishment for the fleet. The "operating forces 
will not be the 'bill-payer' for other requirements" and will be supported with the 
manning and funding required to support readiness. (Jones, 1999). 
The Navy and the Marine Corps are a team. The budgeting and allocation of 
resources should be prioritized to support building and maintaining critical capabilities of 
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both services. The Marine Corps should pursue and adopt opportunities to enhance 
operational and administrative interaction with the Navy. (Jones, 1999). 
The Commandant has stated that "one of the greatest strengths of the Marine 
Corps is the willingness to embrace change." This value will certainly be put to the test as 
Installations transform their business practices. 
3. Mission 
Mission is simply the purpose or reason an organization exists. The primary 
mission of the Marine Corps is readiness for operations across the spectrum of conflict. 
(Jones, 1999). Installations are the fifth element of the Marine Air Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF). There would be no readiness without installations providing a platform for 
Marines to prepare and launch their forces. The installations are responsible for providing 
everything from live-fire "shoot and maneuver" training support to family homes, and 
everything in-between. 
Specific missions vary at each installation, however all have many common 
support requirements. The common support includes providing a home base for the 
Marine units and their equipment, providing meaningful training opportunities and 
support, providing facilities to store and maintain unit equipment, and providing a place 
to live with community support for active duty members and their families. Installations 
support the quality oflife (QOL) of Marines and their families. (Jones, 1999). 
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4. Strategic Issues 
Strategic issues are fundamental policy questions or challenges that affect an 
organization's mandates, values, or mission. For an organization to survive and prosper, 
strategic issues must be dealt with quickly and effectively. (Bryson, 1995). 
The Marine Corps, in recognizing the need for headquarters level direction, 
issued their Installations Campaign Plan (ICP) in January 2000. (McKissack, 2000). The 
ICP provides direction to develop, maintain, and sustain installations in the three core 
areas of readiness, sustainment, and reform. 
a. Readiness 
Installations are a critical link to sustain the operating forces training 
requirements and supporting quality of life (QOL) for the Marines and their families. 
Readiness in the context of installation requirements can be defined as the training, 
programs, systems, organizations, facility support, and services necessary to support the 
Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) in-garrison and while deployed. 
b. Sustainment 
Installations provide a variety of facilities and services to sustain Marines 
development, training, and readiness. Installations support the quality of living and 
working for Marines, their families and the civilian workforce. The ICP calls for 
adequate funding levels to maintain facilities and sustain installations at high standards to 
meet the requirements of the operating forces. 
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c. Installation Reform 
Installation reform (IR) is the Marine Corps implementation of the 
Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) mandate through incorporation of both private and 
public sector "best business practices". The IR program focuses on improving the 
delivery of goods and services while reducing costs. The IR also extends many earlier 
initiatives such as the National Performance Review (NPR) and the Commission on 
Roles and Missions (CORM), and the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI). The primary tool 
of IR is competitive sourcing of commercial activities to achieve efficiencies and 
improve effectiveness of installation support services. 
5. Vision 
A vision provides clarity of an organization's direction and purpose. Vision 
specifies success in terms of mission, core values, basic strategies, goals and performance 
factors, ethical standards and important rules for decision-making. A vision should 
illustrate a future state and a path to get there. 
In support of transforming the business of the department, the DoN has a 
published business vision. 
The Department of the Navy will continue to provide the dominant global 
naval force and develop future capabilities to safeguard the nation. The 
department will recruit, engage, and retain the best people in military and 
civilian service; deliver recognizable value for every dollar spent; and 
create a business environment focused on teamwork and outcomes. 
(Danzig, 1998). 
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The ICP states that it provides the vision of the Deputy Commandant of the 
Marine Corps for Installations and Logistics. 
The ICP is my vision to ensure our installations provide and sustain the 
optimum facilities, services, logistics, and support services to continue to 
make and train Marines, and maintain readiness into the 21 51 Century. It 
will enable our Installation Commanders and our leadership to adjust for 
future operational concepts and meet these USMC warfighting missions. 
(McKissack, 2000). 
Both of these "visions" provide direction setting for Marine Corps installations in 
terms of mission, core values, basic strategies, and goals. However, the visions 
articulated do not clearly illustrate a future state and a path to get there. The power of a 
vision statement that shows a clear understanding of purpose and the contribution of each 
stakeholder is undeniable. A vision statement should provide a clear sense of direction 
for implementing change, establish performance expectations, and create a sense of 
ownership among participants. (Froman, 2000). 
6. Goals 
The ICP identifies a need to balance self-sufficiency with the ability to acquire 
services from external organizations, both public and private. Installation managers will 
need to adopt new IT systems, innovative processes, and alternative sources to satisfy 
deficiencies. A regional approach will be necessary to solve mission critical shortfalls in 
the future. Installations must divest unneeded and excess infrastructure at every 
opportunity. 
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The ICP identifies a critical goal to retain and provide continued and 
uninterrupted access to ranges, airspace, and amphibious training areas. These goals are a 
significant challenge in the changing environment oftoday. 
A critical concern is adequate housing services. Adequate barracks spaces will be 
provides to all eligible bachelor personnel. The ICP goal is to: manage bachelor quarters 
(BQ) consistently to meet unit integrity requirements; provide sufficient military 
construction (MILCON) funds to meet a two person assignment standard; use public-
private ventures (PPV) projects where sensible; eliminate the backlog of maintenance; 
and replace room furnishings on a whole-room basis. 
Housing for married Marines is also a primary concern. Installations will help 
families find suitable and affordable housing in the community or in government 
quarters. Housing referral assistance will be strengthened to provide greater access to 
available private sector housing. Construction and renovation projects for government 
quarters will pursue PPV where it makes sense. 
To sustain the operating forces the ICP requires installations to measure and 
assess readiness of installation supporting facilities. Assessment factors and shortfalls 
will be identified and articulated in the Commanding Officer's Readiness Reporting 
System (CORRS). 
Traffic management and deployment support systems will consider partnering 
opportunities, automation and competition where it makes sense. The ICP also directs 
support of DoD initiatives to reengineer personnel property and HHG movement 
processes. 
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The Marine Corps will streamline contracting processes by incorporating 
emerging technologies such as Electronic Commerce (EC) and Standard Procurement 
System (SPS) and government-wide purchase card. 
Stable and sufficient Base Operating and Support (BOS) funds will be provided 
for installation support. A balance will be maintained between providing services and 
minimizing costs by selective contracting, a critical review of available resources and 
installation reform. 
Installation Reform (IR) will rely on the four key tools of elimination, 
regionalization, reengineering, and competition identified in the DRI to improve business 
practices. Additionally, activity based costing (ABC) will be implemented to measure the 
cost of performance and savings. 
a. Elimination 
Non-critical support functions will be reviewed to identify candidates for 
elimination, reduction, and divestiture through privatization. Privatization is limited to 
utilities and family housing functions at this time. 
b. Regionalization 
Regional review boards will examine organizational and functional 
alignment to consolidate responsibilities for providing goods and services in geographical 
areas. The goal will be to realign organizationally when costs can be reduced while 
maintaining levels of service. A successful example of the Marine Corps regionalization 
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efforts is the Garrison Mobile Equipment (GME) consolidation in the southwestern 
United States. By a simple redistribution of assets over $461,000 was saved in the first 
month of operation. (McDowell, 2000). 
c. Reengineering 
Functions that are not competed under A-76 will be reviewed and a 
reengineering analysis conducted to reduce costs and maintain or improve performance. 
Data from ABC models will be used to identify opportunities for improvements. 
d. Competition 
All functions containing commercial activity (CA) functions will be 
reviewed to determine ifthey should be competed under the guidance of A-76. 
Competitions will be completed in the minimum time possible. 
The ICP states that IR will focus on a common and consistent Marine 
Corp-wide model of standard business areas, functions and sub-functions. The Marine 
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Strategy specifies the direction of the organization in terms of mission, values, 
goals and objectives. The pattern developed by organizational policies, programs, 
actions, decisions, and resource allocation define a strategy. Strategy is typically the first 
organizational component to be addressed because it establishes the criteria for choosing 
among alternative organizational forms. 
The Marine Corps business plan provides installations with the strategies and 
expectations for transforming their operations and workforce to improve the delivery of 
goods and services at a reduced cost. The most recent business plan was issued by the 
Assistant Commandant (ACMC) in July 2000, and provides the following principles to 
guide this major change initiative. 
• Management of Marine Corps installations will be an outcome-based 
management approach based on a full range of performance improvement and 
resource saving initiatives. 
• The roles and expectations of the installation commander will evolve to 
accommodate business-oriented decision-making. 
• The workforce will be kept involved and informed on initiatives for 
improving performance and reducing resource requirements. 
• Successful and enduring organizational change will require implementing new 
performance and cost management skills into the Marine Corps. 
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The plan is intended to apply to all installation activities, both commercial (CA) 
and inherently governmental (IHG) functions. The overall strategy is subdivided into four 
distinct focus areas of planning, execution, metrics and reports, and human resources. 
The business plan provides policy and implementation strategy for each focus area. 
a. Planning 
The planning focus area concentrates on direction setting by senior 
leadership. One goal of the area is to provide consistent Marine Corps vision, mission, 
and expected outputs by publishing a consolidated Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) 
level business reform strategic plan. Business reform alternatives will be articulated by 
individual strategic plans at each installation. Individual strategies expressed by this 
focus area include: 
• Develop a single USMC installation strategic plan that coordinates all 
HQMC and installation stakeholders. 
• Develop a strategic plan and balanced scorecard for each installation 
based on a uniform template that supports the mission, vision, key 
processes and outputs, strategies and measurements contained in the 
USMC plan. 
• Develop a plan to collect installation resource requirements in activity 
based format consistent with the USMC installation strategic plan and 
scorecard. 
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• Review entire organization using the strategic sourcing assessment 
process to determine the best sourcing alternative for all Marine Corps 
activities. 
• Publish and implement standard definitions for business reform terms. 
• Create USMC Center for Business Excellence (CBE) 
• Integrate MARFORRES into Business Reform. 
b. Execution 
The methodology for improving business practices at installations is 
provided in the execution focus area. Competitive sourcing will be used as the preferred 
method where feasible. Other methods include regionalization and partnering with other 
governmental agencies. Individual strategies of the execution focus area include: 
• Improve visibility of performance and cost data for installation 
business processes by using activity based costing (ABC) models. 
• Use ABC information and the results of strategic sourcing assessments 
to improve performance and reduce resources through competition, 
regionalization, partnering with others, process management, and 
divestiture of functions by privatization, reduction, or elimination. 
• Leverage information technology by simplifying data collection and 
delivering user-friendly information to the decision-maker 
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• Complete announced A-76 competitions on schedule and continuously 
review inhouse functions to identify opportunities for additional 
competitions. 
c. Metrics and Reports 
The metrics and report focus area acknowledges a need to measure 
savings and performance impacts. Measures are intended to ensure cost and performance 
improvements do not diminish readiness. Individual strategies articulated by this focus 
area include: 
• Validate FY99 baseline ABC data and add critical performance 
measures. 
• Measure improvements in performance and cost management of 
installations against the FY99 baseline. 
• Review and revise expectations and measures based on strategic plans 
and strategic goals. 
d. Human Resources 
The human resources focus area addresses concerns that the business 
improvement processes will negatively impact the workforce. Communication and 
employee development initiatives are identified. Individual strategies identified in the 
focus area include: 
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• Develop a viable transition management plan that takes care of the 
people impacted by business reform implementation. 
• Maintain communications plans that keep the workforce fully 
informed of all business reform initiatives. 
• Identify critical business skills needed and develop an education and 
training plan to enhance the capabilities of the inhouse work force. 
• Determine installation staff, structure, and billet requirements to 
sustain improved business practices. 
• Develop best practices for human resource management that aligns 
with other improved business practices (e.g., recruiting, training, 
promoting, performance recognition). 
E. DESIGN FACTORS 
Organization design factors refer to the individual elements and the construct of 
an organization. The design factor elements included in this model are similar to the 
Congruence Model transformation process. Each of the design factors may be modified 
by management intervention to obtain system change. The congruence or "fit" of these 
elements is critical to the overall system operation. 
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1. Tasks/Jobs 
The work of an organization is comprised of the basic or inherent tasks to be done 
by the individuals, groups or entire organization. Jobs are structured and arranged around 
the tasks to be accomplished. 
Installation activities include both commercial (CA) and inherently 
governmental (IHG) functions. Installation functions and sub-functions are depicted in 
Marine Corp Installation Business Model shown by figure 4-1. 
2. Technology 
Technology refers to the processes, both physical and mental, used to transform 
inputs into usable outputs. In this context technology is more than technological devices 
and equipment used by people, but includes their knowledge and activities as well. 
Technology affects the behavior of individuals and the functioning of organizations. 
Enhancing the technology of an organization can lead to more efficient and effective 
transformation of inputs into outputs. 
The technology employed to operate Marine Corps installations would not be 
considered "state of the art," but rather outdated. Many of the facilities were constructed 
circa 1950 for something other than current use. It is common to find administrative 
operations in a facility that was converted from its original purpose as an open-squad-bay 
barracks. 
The Marine Corps is significantly behind in information technology (IT). 
Installations are only now beginning to update IT infrastructure and still lag far behind 
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the other services in this area. It is still common to find entire organizations with 
connectivity limited to a few phone-lines and no local area network (LAN) access at all. 
The DoN recently awarded a large outsourcing contract that will provide IT support 
jointly for both the Navy and Marine Corps. (Dickason, 2000). 
The people working with outdated technology have had to develop unique local 
solutions to get their work done. Many of these solutions are l~ss efficient and effective 
than could be achieved with up to date technology. For these reasons, many manual and 
human intensive systems have been allowed to evolve and remain entrenched in most of 
the installation operation and support areas. 
There is significant resistance and inertia against attempts to employ higher 
technology solutions. Some installation leaders and workers do not support technology 
improvements and fear that their jobs will be unneeded with advancements. 
3. Structure 
Organizational structure refers to the way groups and individuals are arranged 
within an organization with respect to the tasks they perform. The structure of the 
organization is typically established based on the policies, processes and methods 
formally created to get individuals to perform the tasks. An important consideration is the 
organization design or the process of coordinating the structural elements to achieve the 
desired outcomes in an effective manner. 
The organizational structure of a Marine Corps installation is centralized with the 
Commanding General (CG) and Chief of Staff (COS) at the strategic apex of the 
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organization. The organizations of an installation are functionally departmentalized with 
a tall hierarchy and a wide span of control. The organization can best be described as 
mechanistic or a machine bureaucracy. The COS and functional organization leaders are 
the system integrators. 
Command of a major Marine Corps Base is considered a "two star" billet and the 
rank of the CG is usually Major General. The day-to-day operations of the base are 
tended to by the (COS), a senior USMC Colonel (0-6). Some smaller bases are 
commanded by a senior USMC Colonel. Several support staff organizations and major 
functional directorates report to the COS and are responsible for operations within their 
respective areas. 
The Marine Corps does not have a standardized installation or functions and 
responsibilities doctrine. Each individual installation is organized somewhat uniquely. 
Major directorate heads are generally Marines, usually at the 0-6 level. Some bases refer 
to the functional area heads as Assistant Chiefs of Staff (ACOS). Directorates include the 
following functional areas: Manpower; Comptroller; Operations and Training; 
Installations; Logistics; Communications and Data; and Marine Corps Community 
Services. The support staff functions include a Headquarters Battalion, Staff Judge 
Advocate, Inspector, Public Affairs and Protocol among others. Staff organization heads 
are generally below the 0-6 level. Most installations now have a functional organization 
supporting business reform. However, the organization is focused on near term goals 
such as A-76 competitions and not committed to business process management for the 
long term. 
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The Marine Corps Installation Business Model shown in figure 4-1 represents the 
functional areas of a typical installation. However, the Business Model doesn't represent 
the organizational structure uniquely different for each installation. 
4. People 
Understanding the experience and background, motives, expectations and 
mindsets of their people is of critical importance to an organization. There is substantial 
evidence of a strong connection between how an organization manages their people and 
the success it will achieve. 
The personnel working at Marine Corps bases are about half uniform military and 
half civilian. The civilian population is comprised of both civil servant and non-
appropriated fund (NAF) employees. Most functional organizations are well integrated 
with both military and civilian employees occupying all types of positions. One notable 
exception is the facilities maintenance, or "public works" organization that is almost 
exclusively civilian blue-collar workers. 
One reason for the high degree of integration of military within the installation 
operations functional areas is the need to provide a "shore" rotation assignment so that 
Marines are "deployed" not more than half of the time. Marines are rotated about every 
three years and it is unlikely a Marine will receive back to back assignments to an 
installation billet, especially at the same base. Rarely does a senior 0-6 or CG remain in a 
billet longer than two years. It is even more rare that a CG or senior 0-6 will have had 
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more than one two year base assignment prior to their current assignment, and some have 
never been assigned to a base billet before. 
All Marines are "warriors" first and an installation assignment is considered less 
desirable for career advancement opportunities than equivalent assignments in the FMF 
or to FMF staff support positions. Installation assignments are not considered to provide 
relevant and meaningful training and education and, therefore, are not career enhancing 
for many Marine Military Occupational Specialties (MOS's). The civilians in a base, 
many, who are "former Marines," are generally considered the "continuity" of base 
organizations. 
A recent study ofNavy shore installations identified 17 core knowledge, skills, 
and abilities (KSA) necessary to successfully manage a military installation. Most of the 
skills and competencies pertain exclusively to installation management. The study 
identified that commanding officers are less than adequately prepared for the KSA's they 
will need to be successful prior to assuming command. (Smith, 1996). 
Installations are plagued with outdated technology and the people have had to 
develop unique local solutions to get their work done. The mindset that has developed is 
that any problem can be overcome by working harder with the same tools. Many of these 
tools are less efficient and effective than could be achieved with up to date technology 
and innovative solutions. The reward system recognizes working harder as an attribute 
and hinders innovation and creative thinking. The installation leadership is still very 
much risk adverse. 
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5. Processes/Subsystems 
Processes and subsystems are what interconnect and link the elements or design 
factors of an organization together. Marine Corps installations have the characteristics 
and similar critical processes as most typical organizations. 
a. Financial Management 
Financial accountability and control are the steps a manager takes to 
assure performance conforms as near as practical to plan. Financial management, 
budgeting and control are fundamental processes of organization management. 
Resources for installation operation and support are limited and 
constrained. Financial resources are declining as the Marine Corps looks for ways to 
recapitalize aging weapons systems. Human resources are also declining, both military 
and civilian. Financial resource authorization is centralized at one of three Major 
commands, Marine Forces Pacific, Marine Forces Atlantic, or Headquarters Marine 
Corps. Annual budgets, staffing plans and letters of allowance for civilian personnel 
provide the resource authorizations to installations. 
Unlike the operational side of the Marine Corps, installations do not have 
a well-defined strategic direction and generally no interactive control systems. Boundary 
systems typically follow along functional area stovepipe lines. Diagnostic control 
systems also emanate from the functional area alignments. 
Locally, the resources are controlled by functional area as well. Allocation 
of discretionary resources is dependent on local program need and priority set by the CG. 
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The COS generally presides over an Executive Steering Committee (ESC) and a Position 
Management Board (PMB) providing direction for resource allocation or reallocation. 
Planning is typically limited to the current fiscal year. 
Better accounting policies and procedures are needed in order to 
accurately track and compare costs to support the complex and difficult decisions 
required in the competitive process. The Marine Corps has chosen to implement Activity 
Based Costing and Management (ABC/M) to augment their existing financial accounting 
system in order to achieve this goal. The change in accounting procedures is expected to 
occur simultaneously with the other changes. The Marine Corps has articulated a plan for 
implementing ABC/M at the installation level. However, clear direction has not been 
established on how the Marine Corps will use ABC/M outside of the installations. It 
appears that ABC/M will be an additional requirement at the installations. 
The existing financial management system for accounting and budgeting 
does not support the needs of installation managers. The system is cumbersome, labor 
intensive, and severely restricted in capability, as it is antiquated and obsolete. 
Unfortunately, the existing system is the primary means of financial management across 
the Marine Corps and is used for all critical resource applications. For these reasons, 
there is formidable resistance to change. Overcoming these problems may benefit from 
installation reform as the function itself may be an ideal candidate for outsourcing to a 
private sector specialist, similar to the proposed outsourcing of all Defense Finance and 




h. Human Resource Management 
Human resource management includes the policies of recruiting, selecting, 
employee development, education and training that produce the human talent required to 
achieve the strategic direction specified by management. Also included in human 
resource management are the reward systems that provide incentive and motivation for 
accomplishment of goals. The purpose of a reward system is to align employee goals and 
direction with the goals of the organization. Human resource policies build the 
organizational capabilities to execute the strategic direction set by management. 
Incentive and rewards for successful execution of assigned base operation 
and support mission are generally in the form of development opportunity and rank 
promotion. Functional area managers typically are recognized and rewarded for program 
resource growth over a past years baseline. There is no incentive to reduce resource 
requirements. A functional area manager would generally receive a negative incentive 
and recognition for executing a program without exhausting all available resources. 
Typically, when a program manager is successfully executing a program under cost, the 
"saved" resources are reallocated to another program that is not doing as well. In terms of 
business reform, the operating reward system meets the criteria of the classic folly of 
"rewarding A, while hoping for B." (Kerr, 1995). 
The Marine Corps IR initiative will impact both military and civilian 
personnel. Functions performed by military personnel will be converted to civilian or 
outsourced wherever possible, without impacting career progression and rotation 
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requirements. The ICP acknowledges civilian personnel reductions will occur from the 
IR initiative. However, it is intended the workforce be empowered to participate in the IR 
process and comprehensive communication plans be implemented to keep the workforce 
informed. All avenues available within the civilian personnel management system are 
planned to be utilized to minimize disruption while maximizing retraining and 
outplacement opportunities. 
A recent study of Navy shore installations identified 17 core knowledge, 
skills, and abilities (KSA) necessary to successfully manage a military installation. Most 
of the skills and competencies pertain exclusively to installation management. The skills 
include facility and installation finance, civilian personnel, urban planning, 
environmental issues, legal issues, contracting and outsourcing, community relations and 
morale, welfare and recreation (MWR). The study identified that Naval officers are less 
than adequately prepared in the requisite KSA's prior to assuming command. The study 
also identified that the scope of an installation commander is much broader than the 
scope of an equivalent warfighting command. (Smith, 1996). 
c. Communication, Information, Planning and Decision Making 
How information is gathered and processed are important considerations 
in decision-making and communication processes. Decision and information system 
processes are critical to link the organization both horizontally and vertically. 
Organizational structure of a typical Marine Corps installation can be 
described as highly mechanistic and resistant to change. There is a tall hierarchy of 
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authority or "chain of command". Most decision-making "authority" is centralized with 
the CG and COS at the strategic apex of the organization, similar to the operating forces 
structure within the FMF. 
Subordinate organizational elements are structured by functional area with 
a multitude of functional specialists responsible for executing their somewhat 
standardized assigned functional aspects ofthe organization. This technostructure 
contains the real power of the organization, a true Mintzberg machine bureaucracy. Rapid 
rotation at the top of the hierarchy reinforces resistance to real change. Partially 
implemented changes in organizational direction routinely fade with the change of 
command. Initiating and sustaining change in this environment is difficult. 
Few installation CG's or COS's have time to develop or execute their 
duties with a true business focus. This is not to say that they do not possess the ability to 
make good business decisions. However, in a warrior community they usually did not 
rise to the position they hold because of their business decision-making skills. They are 
good leaders and attempt to compensate for a lack of business "experience" and "skills" 
with "intuition" and "gut feel" when faced with a difficult business decision. There is no 
true business support organization with the knowledge skills and abilities available to 
advise the leadership on critical business decisions. 
d. Acquisition and Contracting 
Another important process of an organization is what goods and services 
are obtained from external sources, and how they are procured. 
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Marine Corps installations generally have two warranted contracting 
entities for the acquisition of goods and services. An internal Marine Corps contracting 
office procures the goods and services consumed by the base while a Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command (NA VF AC) contracting office is responsible for real property 
maintenance (RPM) and construction requirements. 
The NA VF AC entity is the only DoN warranted contracting office with 
authority to contract for facility construction services, RPM services, maintenance and 
repair services under the Davis-Bacon Act, architect and engineering (A/E) services, 
utility services and commodities, and real property contracts. These contracts are the 
majority of contracting requirements on a typical Marine Corps installation. The internal 
contracting office awards a few service contracts under commercial goods and service 
contract act requirements, usually for small or limited amounts. 
Commercial activities under consideration for A-76 competitions include 
most ofthe functional areas ofRPM and facility maintenance where NAVFAC is the 
only authorized DoN authority. The Marine Corps has expressed a desire to award any 
A-76 contracts for installation support through the Marine Corps internal contracting 
office. Any large installation service contract from an A-76 study in the facility 
maintenance functional area would certainly exceed the existing authority of a Marine 
Corps contracting office. In addition, the service contracting experience level of the 
Marine Corps contracting offices is substantially less than the experience level of the 
corresponding NA VF AC office. For example, one Marine Corps regional contracting 
office is responsible for administering less than $5 million annually in service contracts, 
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while the corresponding NA VF AC office administers over $1 billion annually. The lack 
of experience in large service contracting experience is a major concern for the success of 
outsourcing base services. 
F. CULTURE 
Management causes a cultural change by intervening in system direction setting 
or organization design factors. Organizational culture cannot be acted upon directly by 
management intervention. Organizational culture is a result of behavior and attitudes of 
the people within the organization. 
The basic components of organizational culture are values, beliefs, and norms. 
Organizational core values are what an organization "believes" to be good or bad. These 
values cannot be proved or disproved, either you agree or disagree. Beliefs are specific 
views on how the world works. Beliefs may or may not be true and are open to debate. 
Beliefs are often built around cause and effect relationship. Norms represent the behavior 
or expectation of behavior caused by the values and beliefs of an organization. 
Marine Corps installations have two distinct subcultures today. Norms and values 
differ between the civilian and military population. Some of this difference may be 
caused by the aging and shrinking of the civilian workforce over the last decade. (Ferris, 
1999). Outsourcing may enter a third distinct subculture when contractors enter the 
installation work force in large numbers. Members of the American military are much 
more conservative than their civilian counterparts and the gap appears to be growing. 
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(Korb, 1996). Both harbor strong negative stereotypes about the other according to a 
recent study. (Kennedy, 2000). 
Outsourcing and privatization creates its own cultural gap between civilian 
employees and military members. The military members generally do not fear loss of job 
from outsourcing, where as for civilians, particularly the lower grade white-collar and 
blue-collar workers, their jobs are threatened. White-collar workers in higher grades are 
an exception to the threat of losing their jobs to outsourcing. (Brower, 1997). 
The Marine Corps espouses a highly held value of putting their people first. One 
focus area of their Business Plan is on taking care of their people and implementing best 
practices in human resource management. An outsourcing strategy has proven to weaken 
or destroy some organizational cultures in the private sector when applied in efforts to 
minimize costs. There is a substantial and rapidly expanding body of evidence that points 
to a strong connection between how firms manage their people and the economic results 
achieved. (Pfeffer, 1999). 
The Marine Corps installations have a strong sense of independence and self-
reliance. A high value is placed on maintaining the separation of one installation from 
others. The norm of this behavior will be difficult to overcome when regional 
consolidation is considered. Marine Corps installations are even more wary of losing 
their identity when considering consolidating installations with other service or when 
relying on the local community as a service provider. 
Marines and their leaders believe strongly that they have unique support 
requirements. The belief will be hard to overcome when considering reform initiatives 
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such as housing privatization. It will be a difficult decision for any Marine Corps 
installation Commander to relinquish control of a support service such as family housing 
to a private sector contractor. 
G. OUTPUTS 
Output describes the goods or services the organization produces in very general 
terms. One indicator of success for the organization can be measured in terms of output. 
Performance can be determined in terms of three factors. First, how well the organization 
meets strategic objectives. Second, how well the organization uses scarce resources. 
Third, how successful the organization is at positioning itself to seize the opportunities 
and stave off the threats presented by the environment. 
Typical measures of success for installation operations include providing support 
services for the quality of life (QOL) of Marines and their families, providing training 
support for operational units, and providing mission readiness support for operational 
units stationed on the installation. Additionally, installations provide support for military 
retirees and to the community at large as outputs. 
The Marine Corps has not established any standard measurement process for 
measuring services provided. Expectations are high that services meet the requirements 
of service receivers. The default standard is typically reaction to feedback from service 
receivers. The feedback mechanisms also substitute for performance indicators. 
A common measure within each of these outcomes is the ability to maintain self-
sufficiency. Successful achievement of the stated outcomes relies on the ability to 
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provide for them internally, on demand, and without interference or reliance on external 
entities. 
H. OUTCOMES 
The outcomes of an organization can be defined as the consequences or 
implication of the outputs to stakeholders. Outcomes must be viewed by the organization 
in context with the external environment. 
The outcomes of Marine Corps installations are the consequences of services 
provided to stakeholders, especially the Marines and their family members that work and 
live on the installation. Installation services are support for the quality of life (QOL) of 
Marines and their families, training support for operational units, and mission readiness 
support for operational units stationed on the installation. 
The accepted measures of merit for outcomes include quality, cost, efficiency, 
and effectiveness of providing the services. These outcome characteristics are important 
but subjective and difficult to measure directly. Few quantifiable output measures are 
routinely used, although some are measured. There are fewer performance measures or 
accepted standards of performance for these outputs. 
I. SUMMARY 
This chapter described a Marine Corps installation as an organizational system 
using the Organizational Systems Framework model introduced in Chapter II and 
illustrated by figure 2-5. The system is reviewed under the effects major business reform 
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initiatives initiated by DoD are having on Marine Corps installation management 
practices. Marine Corps installations are represented as an organizational system 
operating in a larger external environmental context partly created by the DoD business 
reform initiatives. 
Operation of a major Marine Corps installation is a complex process requiring 
many different disciplines and skill sets. Installations are like major cities in scope and 
responsibility. However, many of the support services provided by installation personnel 
are not considered core competencies of the Marine Corps. To a large degree, these 
installation services are commercial activities (CA) that are not inherently governmental 
(IHG) or military in nature. Therefore, determination of who will provide the services 
and how they will be provided is widely unrestricted. 
Successfully shifting base operation priorities will require transformational 
change. The change is more than the usual reorganization or occasional contracting out of 
a single function. Major decisions will be required, true private sector business type 
decisions. Shifting the key performance indicator of self-sufficiency to effectiveness and 
efficiency will require a new type of decision making system for our base operation 
leadership. The new decisions will include determining what functions are core 
requirements; which functions should be privatized; what property should be divested; 
what services are necessary to provide; which services should be regionalized; which 
services truly require in-house providers; and which services should be competitively 
sourced. Reducing the costs of the Marine Corps support infrastructure through better 
business practices is expected to release the funds necessary to support weapons system 
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modernization. One of the primary elements of business reform is strategic sourcing. 
Strategic sourcing maximizes savings through eliminating, improving, or streamlining 
processes, and utilizing competitive sourcing processes using A-76 procedures where 
they apply. (Pint, 1997). A particular concern is the Marine Corps past performance in 
strategic sourcing has been limited, slow, and often ineffective. For strategic sourcing to 
be effective, the Marine Corps must improve their sourcing strategies and performance. 
(Moore, 1999). 
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V. SURVEY DATA AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A survey was conducted to augment the archival research data from literature 
reviews presented in the preceding chapters. The purpose of this chapter is to present 
survey data and an analysis of the data collected. First, a description of the methodology 
employed in conducting the survey. The intent of the survey was to provide opinion data 
to support this thesis from Marine Corps installation managers. Second, data and data 
analysis will be presented using the Organizational Systems Framework model 
introduced in Chapter II and illustrated by figure 2-5. 
Installation managers are in a unique position to assess actual organizational 
system elements because they are actively involved in implementing the initiatives 
mandated by the DoD change initiatives and Marine Corps direction. The focus of the 
survey was to obtain feedback directly from Marine Corps installation managers on the 
affects of major DoD business reform initiatives to supplement the archival research data 
presented in Chapters III and IV. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
An opinion survey was prepared with questions categorized by the five 
organizational system areas of system direction, design factors, culture, outputs and 
outcomes. The survey was provided to 66 civilian and military managers at three Marine 
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Corps Installations. Responses were received from 35 managers in the time period 
requested. Each responder was asked to select the most appropriate response based on a 
five-level Likert scale. The survey questions were evaluated using a Chi-square (x2) test 
for statistical significance. The purpose of the x2 test is to determine if the responses to 
each question were random or whether something unrelated to chance is occurring. The 
x
2 test used for data analysis was the Goodness of fit test and the formula. When the 
calculated value ofx2 is equal to or greater than 3.84, the probability that the responses 
did not occur randomly is at least 95 percent. Or stated another way, the probability that 
the responses were random is 5 percent or less. 
Operation of a major Marine Corps base is a complex process requiring many 
different disciplines and skill sets. Each installation has unique requirements and 
therefore unique characteristics. There are however many similarities and common 
support requirements. The Survey instrument was intended to focus on common support 
requirements. The three Marine Corps installations include two West Coast and one East 
Coast installation were chosen as a sample representative of all Marine Corps 
installations. 
C. SURVEYDATA 
The focus of the survey was to obtain feedback directly from Marine Corps 
installation managers on the affects of major DoD business reform initiatives to 
supplement the archival research data. Those actively involved in executing the change 
process at Marine Corps installations were asked to provide substantive data. Data and 
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data analyses are presented using the Organizational Systems Framework model 
introduced in Chapter II. The survey questions, data, and data analysis is presented in 
detail in Appendix 1. 
1. System Direction 
Two objectives where intended by the survey questions under the systems 
direction area. First, question one through four were devised to validate the findings of 
the archival research that competitive sourcing, regionalization, privatization and 
business process reengineering are affecting installation management practices. Second, 
question five was devised to ascertain if the Marine Corps vision for installations in the 
future has been clearly articulated to the installations managers. The system direction 
area survey questions are restated below. 
• Question 1: Competitive sourcing base services by the A-76 process is 
changing base operations. 
• Question 2: Consolidation or regionalizing base support functions is changing 
base operations. 
• Question 3: Privatizing functions such as family housing and utilities is 
changing base operations. 
• Question 4: Business Process Reengineering such as activity based costing 
(ABC) and direct vendor delivery is changing base operations. 
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• Question 5: The Marine Corps has articulated a clear vision that describes 
what bases will look like in the future. 
Chi-square analysis of the survey results indicates that responses for all five 
questions have a x2 greater than 3.84, p ~ .05. Installation managers who responded 
significantly perceive that competitive sourcing, regionalization, privatization, and 
business process reengineering are changing installation operations. The analysis 
indicated their responses are not likely due to chance. The installation managers also 
indicated strong disagreement that the Marine Corps has articulated a clear vision of how 
installations will be organized in the future. The mandated major business reform 
initiatives of DoD are clearly impacting the operations of Marine Corps installations. The 
survey results for the system direction area are presented in Table 5-l. 
MEA Question ME .PH Disagree ,tlgree AGREE OR CHI p~.os 
Number AVE DISIGREE Square Yes/No 
SYSTEM 1 4.20 3 30 V:lree 25.04 Yes 
DIRECTION 2 4.26 3 32 V:lree 27.03 Yes 
3 4.00 3 27 V:lree 22.04 Yes 
4 3.80 5 25 V:lree 18.05 Yes 
5 2.03 28 1 Disagree 25.04 Yes 
TABLE 5-1 SYSTEM DIRECTION SURVEY QUESTION RESULTS 
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2. Design Factors 
The design factors survey questions focused on specific areas concerning people, 
processes and structure elements. Questions one through six were intended to provide an 
indication of installation managers perception of the effectiveness and efficiency of base 
services provided by Marines, civil servants and contractors. Questions seven and eight 
solicit the managers perceptions concerning personnel knowledge, skills and abilities of 
business practices. Questions nine, ten and 13 through 15 assess process element 
perceptions. Questions 11 and 12 indicate installation managers opinion on specific 
structure elements. The design factors area survey questions are restated below. 
• Question 1: Base services provided by Marines are effective. 
• Question 2: Base services provided by Civil Servants are effective. 
• Question 3: Base services provided by Contractors are effective. 
• Question 4: Marines are efficient at providing base services. 
• Question 5: Civil Servants are efficient at providing base services. 
• Question 6: Contractors are efficient at providing base services. 
• Question 7: Base personnel possess the knowledge, skills and abilities 
(KSA's) to successfully implement business reform. 
• Question 8: Base personnel possess the KSA's necessary to operate like a 
private sector business. 
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• Question 9: The base financial management system effectively supports 
business operations. 
• Question 10: Base personnel possess the KSA's to successfully execute major 
service contracts. 
• Question 11: The existing base organization structure will support business 
reform. 
• Question 12: The base is prepared to integrate contractors into the workforce. 
• Question 13: Base personnel are rewarded for supporting business reform. 
• Question 14: A base staff job is detrimental to a Marine Officer's career. 
• Question 15: The Marine Corps adequately prepares Officers for base duty 
assignments. 
Survey analysis indicates results are significant for all design factor questions 
except four and 14 (p ~ .05). Again, the responses from managers are not random. 
Respondents significantly agree that civil servants and contractors are efficient in 
providing installation services. Results were not significant concerning whether or not 
Marines are efficient in providing installation services. Results indicate that installation 
managers believe Marines, civil servants, and contractors are effective at delivering 
installation services. 
Analysis of survey questions on the business knowledge, skills, and abilities 
(KSA) yielded a significant results (x2 value greater than 3.84, p ~ 0.05) indicating 
installation managers believe personnel may not possess the necessary KSA's to 
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successfully implement business reform or to operate like a private sector business. 
Results also indicated that existing base structure may not adequately support business 
reforms and that installations may not be prepared to integrate contractors into the 
existing workforce. 
Analysis of the process area design factor survey questions were significant (x2 
value greater than 3.84, p::::; 0.05) indicating that the existing financial management 
system may not support business reform and that personnel may not be sufficiently 
rewarded for business reform efforts. In addition, results were significant that Marine 
officers may not be adequately prepared for installation assignments. Results were not 
significant possible detrimental results to an Officer's career from installation 
assignments. Findings were not significant concerning the ability ofbase personnel to 
successfully execute major service contracts. The survey results for the system direction 
area are presented in Table 5-2. 
AREA Question MEMI Disagree Pgree AGREE OR CHI p~.05 
Number AVE DISPGREE Square Yes/No 
DESIGN 1 3.46 5 20 P>Dree 13.07 Yes 
FPCTORS 2 3.89 1 27 P>Dree 24.04 Yes 
3 3.37 3 16 P>Dree 11.08 Yes 
4 3.09 12 17 P>Dree 3.20 No 
5 3.71 2 23 P>Dree 19.05 Yes 
6 3.31 5 18 P>Dree 11.08 Yes 
7 2.74 17 10 Disaaree 5.14 Yes 
8 2.63 20 7 Disaaree 11.08 Yes 
9 2.09 26 5 Disaaree 19.05 Yes 
10 3.11 10 16 P>Dree 4.17 Yes 
11 2.69 20 9 Disaaree 9.09 Yes 
12 2.57 16 4 Disaaree 10.08 Yes 
13 2.37 24 5 Disaaree 17.05 Yes 
14 2.94 10 11 P>Dree 0.00 No 
15 2.40 21 3 Disaaree 16.06 Yes 
TABLE 5-2 DESIGN FACTOR SURVEY QUESTION RESULTS 
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3. Culture 
The culture area survey questions were developed to ascertain differences in 
values and patterns of interaction that may impede integration efforts. The area 
concerning the differences in values was addressed by questions one through six. 
Questions seven through thirteen assesses interaction patterns and attempt to ascertain if 
the culture impedes efforts to integrate Marine Corps installations with other 
communities as mandated by the DoD change initiatives. The culture area survey 
questions are presented as follows. 
• Question 1: Marines are comfortable interacting with other Marines for base 
services. 
• Question 2: Marines are comfortable interacting with Civil Service employees 
for base services. 
• Question 3: Marines are comfortable interacting with Contractors for base 
services. 
• Question 4: Civil Service employees have the same values as Marines. 
• Question 5: Contract employees have the same values as Marines. 
• Question 6: The Installation Commander should be in control or command of 
service providers. 
• Question 7: Marine Corps bases should be integrated with the local 
community. 
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• Question 8: Marine Corps bases should be consolidated regionally. 
• Question 9: Marine Corps bases should be consolidated with Navy bases. 
• Question 10: Marine Corps bases should be consolidated with bases of all 
services. 
• Question 11: Marine Corps bases should be integrated with the local 
community. 
• Question 12: Family housing should be provided by Marine Corps bases. 
• Question 13: Marines and their families have unique support requirements 
when compared with the public sector. 
Results were significant that installation managers may perceive a clear difference 
in values between Marines and contractors providing services. The data further suggest 
that Marines may not be comfortable interacting with contractors for providing base 
services. Additionally, Marines may be comfortable receiving support services from civil 
service personnel, although the values of Marines and civil service personnel may differ. 
Results indicate that installation managers agree that a hierarchical control system should 
exist with installation commander having ultimate authority. 
Respondents significantly perceive resistance in terms of Marine Corps 
installations being consolidated with Navy installations, other service installations, or 
integrated with the local community. The finding was not significant concerning whether 
Marine Corps installations should be consolidated regionally. 
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Respondents clearly perceived that Marine Corps installations should provide 
family housing. Additionally, the installation managers perceive that Marines and their 
families have unique requirements when compared with the private sector. 
The survey results for the culture area are presented in Table 5-3. 
MEA Question MEAN Disagree Agree AGREE OR CHI pS.os 
Number AVE DIS/aGREE Square Yes/No 
CULTURE 1 4.29 0 31 Agree 29.03 Yes 
2 3.37 7 18 Agree 9.09 Yes 
3 2.86 12 8 Disagree 2.25 No 
4 3.06 14 13 Disagree 0.00 No 
5 2.20 22 1 Disaqree 19.05 Yes 
6 4.06 4 28 Aqree 22.04 Yes 
7 2.83 15 9 Disaqree 4.17 Yes 
8 3.09 16 17 Aqree 0.00 No 
9 2.20 24 6 Disaqree 16.06 Yes 
10 2.06 24 5 Disagree 17.05 Yes 
11 2.69 16 8 Disagree 6.13 Yes 
12 3.26 9 15 Agree 4.17 Yes 
13 3.77 8 25 Agree 15.06 Yes 
TABLE 5-3 CULTURE SURVEY QUESTION RESULTS 
4. Outputs 
The objective of the survey questions for the output area was to determine what 
outputs are critical and if they are measured and assessed. Question one through seven 
were devised to determine the service critical outputs of a Marine Corps installation. 
Question eight was intended to determine the Marine Corps installation managers 
opinion on use of a standard measurement process for services provided. Question nine 
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was intended to determine the managers opinion on use of a standard performance 
indication system. The output area survey questions are restated below. 
• Question 1: Providing a place for the FMF to train in support of improving 
their readiness is one of the most important outputs. 
• Question 2: Providing a place for the FMF to work and maintain their 
equipment readiness is one of the most important outputs. 
• Question 3: Providing a place for Marines and Family Members to live is 
one of the most important outputs. 
• Question 4: Providing support services for Marines is one of the most 
important outputs. 
• Question 5: Providing support services for Marines and Family members 
is one of the most important outputs. 
• Question 6: Providing support services for military retirees is one of the 
most important outputs. 
• Question 7: Providing support services for the community is one of the most 
important outputs. 
• Question 8: A standard measurement process is used for measuring the 
services provided. 
• Question 9: Performance indicators that identify how well services are 
provided are in use. 
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Chi-square analysis of the output area survey questions found that installation 
managers significantly perceive (p:::;; .05) that the outputs of providing a place for the 
Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) to work, train, and live is important. The findings of the 
survey also indicate significant agreement that providing support to the Marines, their 
families and military retirees is important. Results found that installation managers 
perceive that providing support to the local community at large may not be an important 
output. 
Results indicated that installation that installation managers may not have a 
standard process for measuring the services they provide or performance indicators that 
identify how well they provide the services. The survey results for the output area are 
presented in Table 5-4. 
MEA Question MEA"l Disagree Pgree AGREE OR CHI p~.os 
Number AVE DISIGREE Square Yes/No 
OUTPUTS 1 4.86 u Jo Agree JJ.UJ Yes 
2 4.66 u JJ Agree Jl.UJ Yes 
3 3.83 0 £0 Agree lts.uo Yes 
4 4.20 0 31 Agree 29.03 Yes 
5 4.09 0 28 Agree 26.04 Yes 
6 3.23 10 16 Agree 4.17 Yes 
7 2.03 L8 3 Disagree £,j.U4 Yes 
8 2.26 L5 4 us agree ll:I.UO ves 
9 2.63 1 ( ( us agree ts.lU Yes 
TABLE 5-4 OUTPUTS SURVEY QUESTION RESULTS 
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5. Outcomes 
The survey questions in the area of outcomes reflect respondents perception about 
what installation outcomes are important. Questions one through six target specific 
outcomes identified in the earlier research as the important outcomes for successful 
business reform. Question seven identifies perceptions on how well the Marine Corps has 
articulated their business reform expectations. Question eight identifies whether 
respondents have a clear understanding of their role in business reform. The outcome 
area survey questions are restated below. 
• Question 1: The quality of delivered services to stakeholders is one of the 
most important outcomes. 
• Question 2: The effectiveness of delivered services to stakeholders is one of 
the most important outcomes. 
• Question 3: The cost of delivered services to stakeholders is one of the most 
important outcomes. 
• Question 4: The efficiency of delivered services to stakeholders is one ofthe 
most important outcomes. 
• Question 5: Returning Marines to the FMF by reducing the number assigned 
to base operations is one of the most important outcomes. 
• Question 6: Outsourcing base services is one of the most important 
outcomes. 
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• Question 7: The expectations of business reform have been adequately 
articulated by the Marine Corps. 
• Question 8: I have a clear understanding of my role in executing Marine 
Corps business reform. 
All responses in the outcomes area were significant (x2 value greater than 3.84, p 
:::;; .05). There was strong agreement the important outcomes include quality, 
effectiveness, efficiency, and cost of services delivered by installations as identified by 
the DoD major reform initiatives. Respondents indicated that returning Marines to the 
FMF as identified by CMC guidance is an important outcome. The results indicated that 
respondents do not perceive outsourcing services is an important installation reform 
outcome although outsourcing services is a clear mandate. 
Respondents indicated that the Marine Corps may not have articulated business 
reform expectations adequately. However, respondents said that they have a clear 
understanding of their own role in business reform. The survey results for the outcome 
area are presented in Table 5-5. 
AREA Question ME~ Disagree Agree AGREE OR CHI pS.os 
Number AVE DIS/tGREE Square Yes/No 
OUTCOMES 1 4.40 0 34 IQree 32.03 Yes 
2 4.46 0 34 IQree 32.03 Yes 
3 3.97 3 28 IQree 23.04 Yes 
4 4.26 0 31 ~Qree 29.03 Yes 
5 3.89 3 25 ~ree 20.05 Yes 
6 2.31 20 5 Disagree 13.07 Yes 
7 2.40 22 5 Disagree 15.06 Yes 
8 3.51 9 23 ~ree 12.07 Yes 
TABLE 5-5 OUTCOMES SURVEY QUESTION RESULTS 
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented survey data from an opinion survey. Operation of a major 
Marine Corps base is a complex process requiring many different disciplines and skill 
sets. Each installation has unique requirements and therefore unique characteristics. 
There are however many similarities and common support requirements. The Survey 
instrument was intended to focus on common support requirements. The survey was 
conducted at three Marine Corps installations including two West Coast and one East 
Coast installation chosen to be representative of all Marine Corps installations. 
The questions were arranged using the Organizational Systems Framework model 
areas of system direction, design factors, culture, outputs, and outcomes. The survey was 
provided to 66 civilian and military managers and responses were received from 35 
managers by the requested time. The responses were analyzed using a Chi-square (X2) 
goodness of fit test to determine statistical significance. The results of the opinion survey 
and analysis of the data were presented in this chapter. Significant survey findings were 
identified and presented with the analysis. The survey instrument and raw data is 
presented in Appendix A. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The primary thrust of this study was to conduct a comprehensive review and 
analysis of recent DoD business reform initiatives and the impact they are having on the 
operation and management of Marine Corps installations. The reform initiatives were 
limited to those that substantially impact the management of a major Marine Corps 
installation and require change to current operations. The study analysis was based on an 
Organizational Systems Framework model applied to a typical Marine Corps installation 
as the organizational system under change. 
The Marine Corps is changing the way installations are operated and managed 
because of the effect major DoD reform initiatives are causing. Based on the results of 
this study, implementation of major initiatives is problematic due to incongruence 
between direction (strategy), certain design variables (structure) and results (culture, 
output, and outcomes). This chapter summarizes the findings and provides 
recommendations in terms of an Organizational Systems Framework. The basic premise 
of systems theory is that organizational success is a function of the congruence or fit 
among three key areas: direction, organizational design, and results. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The scope of this research lead to a number of conclusions and recommendations 
on business reform initiative impacts on the operation of Marine Corps installations. 
Conclusions and recommendations are presented in the five Organizational Systems 
Framework areas of system direction, design factors, culture, outputs and outcomes. The 
conclusions are drawn from the data presented in the preceding chapters of this thesis and 
particularly Chapters IV and V. The recommendations are the researchers opinion based 
on the findings, and offered as ways to assist senior leaders and managers to obtain 
desired results of major business reform initiatives. 
1. System Direction 
Conclusion 1: System direction and design factors are the two organizational 
system areas that senior leadership can operate on to effect system changes. The Marine 
Corps has not articulated and communicated a clear vision of the future state that 
installations are expected to achieve. Installations are unable to develop and implement a 
strategy capable of attaining that end state when the vision is unclear. 
The Marine Corps leadership appears to be reacting to mandates from DoD and 
directing the installations to initiate action based on real or perceived need to move 
forward on the initiatives of competitive sourcing, regionalization, privatization, and 
business process reengineering. The installation managers have responded, but do not 
totally understand what they are expected to achieve. The apparent intent to rectify this 
situation is stated in the Marine Corps business plan as development of a comprehensive 
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strategic plan at the headquarters level, with supporting plans at each installation. A clear 
vision articulating the intended target and end state must precede any meaningful 
strategy. 
Recommendation 1: The leadership of the Marine Corps should develop a clear 
vision for installations delineating those functions considered critical to their success. 
The lessons learned from the private sector indicate that successful businesses identify 
what functions are critical to their success and then concentrate on the core competencies 
necessary to excel in those critical functional areas. The de facto vision operative in 
Marine Corps installations today is one of self-sufficiency in all functional areas. 
Business process reform is intended to change the vision, becoming more efficient and 
effective by seeking the optimum service provider in each functional area. 
The Marine Corps should identify and commit to maintaining installation core 
competencies in house. On the other hand, a strategy should be developed to outsource 
functions that are not core, and which a private sector can perform better. These functions 
should be outsourced directly. What functions are core competencies and what functions 
should be outsourced need to be clearly identified to the installations. 
There is also a third category of support functions smaller than the other two. 
These functions would include those that are not core and also do not have a private 
sector provider with a clear advantage. These are the only functions that are suitable for 
competitive sourcing under the A-76 process. A decision to competitively source a 
particular service should be made only after determining the service is not core and that 
no private sector provider with significant advantage is available. 
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2. Design Factors 
Conclusion 1: The organizational structure of a Marine Corps installation is 
centralized with the Commanding Officer at the strategic apex of the organization 
possessing ultimate decision making authority. The organizations of an installation are 
functionally departmentalized with a tall hierarchy and a wide span of control. The 
Marine Corps installation as an organization can best be described as a centralized 
machine bureaucracy. The data indicates that the existing Marine Corps organization 
structure will not adequately support business operations or business reform initiatives. 
Recommendation 1: The Marine Corps should consider restructuring installation 
commands to be more decentralized. One approach would be to create a new position of 
"Installation or 'Garrison' Commander" (for example) at the 0-6 level with a more narrow 
focus and responsibility than the existing commander. For example, the position of Chief 
of Staff could be vested with command authority for all installation support decisions. 
The existing position of Commanding General would still have overall responsibility, but 
without the burden of day to day installation operation decisions. This scheme would 
allow business decisions to be more fluid and to be made more rapidly. A supplementary 
benefit would be a career path specifically targeted for Marine Corps officers with 
installation management experience. 
An additional structural change recommendation is to create a business office 
responsible for managing all installation business processes. The business office concept 
should be similar to the way a city managers position operates in a city government. The 
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business office would need to be staffed with personnel that have the requisite business 
knowledge, skills and abilities. The business officer position would most appropriately be 
staffed by a civilian to support the need for extensive corporate knowledge and 
experience necessary for the long-term objectives of the installation. Some Marine Corps 
installations have recently created a business reform office to provide support for 
implementing reform initiative projects. The concept of a dedicated business office and 
business manager is far more comprehensive with long term focus as compared to the 
limited reform projects that are short term. The current business reform office should be 
incorporated under the purview of the overall business office. 
Conclusion 2: Given the complex environment and wide scope of problems 
encountered in many areas of installation operations, coupled with limited emphasis on 
professional development within these disciplines, it is important, if not critical, that 
installation managers possess mature business skills. Conclusions indicate that in general 
Marine Corps installation managers do not possess the requisite knowledge, skills and 
abilities (KSA) to operate installations as business entities. The data also indicates that 
Marine Corps installation managers do not have the necessary KSA's to successfully 
implement business reform initiatives. 
Recommendation 2: The Marine Corps cannot instantaneously solve the 
problem of a lack of business process KSA's. A two pronged approach focused on short 
and long term objectives might prove optimal. An effective near term solution would 
include increasing outside expertise. Personnel with the requisite KSA's should be 
brought in from the private sector either as Marine Corps employees or by support 
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contract. A secondary long-tenn effort should be initiated to provide meaningful 
education and training to current installation personnel. A potential model to emulate 
appears to be public administration education and experience of a City Manager in local 
government. 
Conclusion 3: The data indicates installation personnel are not rewarded for their 
efforts implementing business refonn initiatives. Until recently there was no recognition 
of the need to become more effective and efficient in providing support services. 
Improving effectiveness and efficiency implies assuming and managing additional risk. 
Managing risk becomes a hard sell in an environment that routinely rewards minimizing 
risk taking. The private sector has developed many tools and techniques to apply to these 
types of problems. In many respects, the current record sustaining economic growth 
period can be credited to improvements in business effectiveness and efficiency. 
Recommendation 3: Installation managers must be recognized and rewarded for 
demonstrating the desired behavior. The existing reward system based on functional area 
or project growth in scope and resources must be revised. Recognition and reward should 
be received by managers that demonstrate business acumen and achieve support goals 
while reducing the amount of resources consumed and improving the services provided. 
The Marine Corps should adopt some of the successful private sector business practices 
for recognition and reward. 
Conclusion 4: The existing financial management system for accounting and 
budgeting does not support the needs of installation managers. The system is 
cumbersome, labor intensive, and severely restricted in capability, as it is antiquated and 
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obsolete. Unfortunately, the existing system is the primary means of financial 
management across the Marine Corps and is used for all critical resource applications. 
For these reasons, there is formidable resistance to change. The data indicates that the 
financial management system does not support business reform. 
The Marine Corps has chosen to implement Activity Based Costing and 
Management (ABC/M) to augment their existing financial accounting system in order to 
support business reform. The change in accounting procedures is expected to occur 
simultaneously with other business reform changes. The Marine Corps has articulated a 
plan for implementing ABC/M at the installation level. However, clear direction has not 
been established on how the Marine Corps will use ABC/M outside of the installations. 
Recommendation 4: If ABC/M methodology is to be effective, it will be 
necessary to revise the primary financial management system as well. The Marine Corps 
should adapt a new and updated financial management system that supports the ABC/M 
goals. The system should be oriented toward business management practices and should 
be a Marine Corps wide initiative. 
Conclusion 5: The Marine Corps has expressed a desire to award any A-76 
contracts for installation support through the Marine Corps internal contracting office. 
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NA VF AC) is the only DoN warranted 
contracting office with authority to contract for facility construction services, real 
property maintenance (RPM) services, maintenance and repair services under the Davis-
Bacon Act, architect and engineering (A/E) services, utility services and commodities, 
and real property contracts. These contracts are the majority of contracting requirements 
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on a typical Marine Corps installation. Any large installation service contract from an A-
76 study in the facility maintenance functional area would certainly exceed the existing 
authority of a Marine Corps contracting office. In addition, the service contracting 
experience level of the Marine Corps contracting offices is substantially less than the 
experience level of the corresponding NA VF AC office. 
Recommendation 5: Marine Corps installations generally have two warranted 
contracting entities for the acquisition of goods and services. An internal Marine Corps 
contracting office procures the goods and services consumed by the base while a Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command (NA VF AC) contracting office is responsible RPM and 
construction requirements. The Marine Corps should take advantage ofthe NA VFAC 
experience and develop a partnership agreement to allow shared contracting 
responsibility. A proposed solution would be to have NA VF AC serve as the Procurement 
Contracting Office (PCO) and the Marine Corps office to serve as the Administrative 
Contracting Office (ACO). 
3. Culture 
Conclusion 1: The data indicates that Marine Corps installation managers do not 
support consolidation with installations from other services or with the local community. 
The existing culture ofMarine Corps installations is to segregate and isolate themselves 
from outside influences and maintain their self-sufficiency. The affects of this cultural 
aspect hinder efforts to regionalize installation services among all DoD installations 
within a geographical local and the efforts to solicit services from the local communities. 
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Recommendation 1: The Marine Corps leadership cannot directly change 
organizational culture. Culture is a reflection of the "what is" state and as such is an 
emergent property. However, the leadership can influence culture by establishing clear 
direction that is congruent with desired results, structure and rewards. The Marine Corps 
should articulate unambiguous direction on the expectations for regionalization and for 
acquiring services from the local communities. 
Conclusion 2: The Marine Corps policy states that family housing should be 
privatized where it makes sense. This ambiguous policy creates a severe impediment to 
the effort to privatize family housing if indeed the intent is to pursue privatization. The 
data indicates a belief by installation managers that installations should provide family 
housing and that Marines have unique requirements. In addition, it appears that 
privatizing family housing is given little consideration in Marine Corps business reform 
management. 
Recommendation 2: Based on the most recent requests to increase the Basic 
Allowance for Housing (BAH) amounts, the DoD policy appears to consistently rely on 
the private sector to provide the majority of family housing. The Marine Corps appears to 
be out of alignment with the DoD position. The Marine Corps policy on privatizing 




Conclusion 1: The data indicate that the Marine Corps has not established a 
standard measurement process for evaluating how well services are provided. The 
expectations of installations are high that services meet the requirements of service 
receivers. The default standard is typically reaction to feedback from service receivers. 
The feedback mechanisms also substitute for performance indicators. 
Recommendation 1: The Marine Corps should establish a standard output 
measurement process. Typical measures of success for installations may include 
providing support services for the quality oflife (QOL) of Marines and their families, 
providing training support for operational units, and providing mission readiness support 
for operational units stationed on the installation. Additionally, installations provide 
support for military retirees and to the community at large as outputs. These outputs may 
warrant consideration for standard measurement as well. 
Conclusion 2: The data indicate that the Marine Corps has not established a 
standard performance indicating process for monitoring how well services are provided. 
Performance indicators can be determined in terms of three factors. First, how well the 
organization meets strategic objectives. Second, how well the organization uses scarce 
resources. Third, how successful the organization is at positioning itself to seize the 
opportunities and stave off the threats presented by the environment. 
Recommendation 2: The Marine Corps should establish a standard performance 
indicating process. Performance indicators that mark achievement of strategic goals and 
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objectives would enhance the ability and success of installation managers. Achieving 
improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery depends on the 
ability to measure performance in terms of minimizing the consumption of resources 
required to meet service support objectives. Installations are not able to recognize or 
address threats and opportunities presented by the external environment without a 
meaningful performance indicator process. 
5. Outcomes 
Conclusion 1: The survey data identified that installation managers espoused an 
opinion that one of the most important outcomes of business reform was returning 
Marines to the FMF. The source of this initiative as a desirable outcome apparently 
comes from the CMC Commandant's Guidance. (Jones, 1999). It is clear that one ofthe 
most important outcomes of business reform is reducing the number of Marines assigned 
to installation billets, and consequently the amount of money spent on those billets. The 
DoD mandates indicate that savings from reducing installation support structure are to be 
reinvested in equipment modernization initiatives, and in fact, the savings are already 
programmed for that expense. By redirecting the savings generated from reducing the 
number ofMarines assigned to installation billets to effectively increase the end strength 
of the FMF, creates an additional cost as an unintended consequence ofbusiness reform. 
This is not to say that increasing the end strength of the FMF is not necessary, or that it 
should not be pursued, only that the policy is incongruent with the intended outcome of 
cutting overall costs to pay for modernization. There is another serious unintended 
159 
consequence created by pursuing this policy. By effectively reassigning the Marines from 
one job to another, any savings realized by billet reductions from business process reform 
initiatives must effectively come at the expense of reducing the civilian population. The 
installations have a dollar savings target that they must achieve. Another unintended 
consequence is that installation managers are less likely to identify Marine billets to be 
eliminated if they receive no credit against their savings mark for Marine billets 
eliminated. 
Recommendation 1: The Marine Corps should follow a consistent direction and 
revise their policy on returning installation Marine billets eliminated by business reform 
to the FMF. If additional end strength is necessary in the FMF, the policy should be 
addressed outside of the business reform initiative. A separate initiative should be created 
to field or realign the additional end strength that includes new or reprogrammed funding 
to pay for the increase. The Marine Corps should provide incentive to the installations for 
identifying all possible Marine billet reductions. The Marine Corps should also identify 
what installation Marine billets should be maintained to support training, shore rotation 
and other requirements. 
Conclusion 2: The DoD business reform mandates identify outsourcing 
installation services that are not core competencies as necessary to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of installation services. The installation managers expressed 
the opinion that outsourcing is not one of the most important outcomes ofbusiness 
reform initiatives. The installations also identified that business reform expectations have 
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not been clearly stated. The installation organizational system outcomes are therefore 
incongruent with system direction setting. 
Recommendation 2: The comprehensive strategy that the Marine Corps business 
plan refers to should provide business reform expectations and clear direction on the 
desirable outcome regarding outsourcing. Specifically, the strategy needs to clearly 
identify those functions considered core competencies, those functions that should be 
competitively sourced, as well as those functions that should be outsourced directly. 
C. RESTATEMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Research Question: 
The primary research question is stated as: "How are Department of Defense 
business process reforms changing the way Marine Corps installations are managed 
and operated?" 
Secondary Research Questions: 
In addition to the primary question, additional secondary research questions will 
require investigation. Secondary research questions include: 
• What elements of the Department of Defense major reform initiative affect 
operation ofMarine Corps installations? 
• What impact does the Department of Defense major reform initiative have on 
the operation of Marine Corps installations? 
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• What is the current state "organizational systems model" for a typical Marine 
Corps base organization? 
• What Base operations changes have been initiated by the Marine Corps 
because of the Department of Defense major reform initiative? 
• What external environment factors are contributing to the changes in business 
processes? 
• What installation business practice mandates to the Marine Corps have 
changed? 
• What Marine Corps installation organizational system elements must change 
to support Department of Defense major reform initiatives? 
• What lessons learned from other public and private organizations can be 
applied to the Marine Corps? 
• What are the essential skills required by Marine Corps installation leaders to 
ensure successful implementation of the mandated changes? 
The research questions served as the basis for inquire of this study. Each of the 
questions was addressed by this study to the extent permitted by the time available and 
subject to limitation of scope. 
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D. LIMITATIONS 
1. Scope Limitations 
The scope of this thesis was intended to be broad in terms of the business reform 
initiatives that were reviewed. Each of the areas identified could become the focus of a 
more narrow independent study. The intent of this thesis was to apply an elevated view 
approach to business reform impacts on Marine Corps installations. 
The scope of this study was limited to major business reform initiatives that have 
been initiated by DoD. It was necessary to exclude other less significant initiatives of 
both DoD and the Marine Corps. 
2. Institutional Obstacles 
The study identified substantial institutional resistance to change within the 
Marine Corps and the installations. Business process reform is a major undertaking of a 
change initiative with scope that far exceeds routine change processes that are more 
familiar. The expanded scope of the business reform initiatives requires the senior 
leadership of the Marine Corps to provide more focused direction setting than usual. 
3. Technical Obstacles 
There were several technical obstacles to business reform identified during the 
course of this study. Some ofthe obstacles identified by the early DSB study remains. 
The most substantial obstacle appears to be the inability to initiate direct outsourcing 
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actions and the timeline of the A-76 process. Reliance on the A-76 process appears to be 
compounded by the decision of DoD to use positions competed as a performance 
indicator for the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). 
Some additional statutory restrictions have not been adequately addressed. Examples 
include the laws regarding real property transfer and the prohibition on contracting guard 
and fire protection services. Additional legislative action would enhance the business 
reform initiatives. 
E. SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES 
This exploratory study has only begun to uncover the growing body of knowledge 
on installation management business reforms. There are several areas that would provide 
an opportunity for more detailed research. Some of those potential research projects 
include: 
• A more detailed analysis of Marine Corps installation organization system 
areas of design factors only. 
• A more detailed analysis of the specific external environmental factors and 
there effects on Marine Corps installation business reform. 
• A detailed analysis ofbusiness reform lessons learned from other service 
business reform initiatives and how they would apply to Marine Corps 
installations. 
• An analysis of city government business reform initiatives and how the 
lessons learned could be applied to Marine Corps installations. 
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
A. SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Survey questions categorized by the five organizational system areas of system 
direction, design factors, culture, outputs and outcomes were provided to 66 civilian and 
military managers at three Marine Corps Installations. Responses were received from 35 
managers in the time period requested. Each responder was asked to select the most 
appropriate response based on the following five level Likert scale. 
1--Strongly disagree 
2--Disagree 
3--No strong feelings 
4--Agree 
5--Strongly agree 
The survey questions were evaluated using a Chi-square (x2) test for statistical 
significance. The purpose of the x2 test is to determine if the responses to each question 
were random or whether something unrelated to chance is occurring. The x2 test used for 
data analysis was the Goodness of fit test and the formula is presented in figure A-1. 
When the calculated value ofx2 is equal to or greater than 3.84, the probability that the 
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responses did not occur randomly is at least 95 percent. Or stated another way, the 
probability that the responses were random is 5 percent or less. 




Figure A-1 Goodness of Fit Test 
x2 ~ 3.84, p s: .os 
x2 ~ 6.69, p s: .01 
p = probability of error 
The survey questions are listed below followed by the raw survey data presented 
in Table A-1. The data analysis is presented in Table A-2. 
SYSTEM DIRECTION: 
1. Competitive sourcing base services by the A-7 6 process is changing 
base operations. 
2. Consolidation or regionalizing base support functions is changing base 
operations. 
3. Privatizing functions such as family housing and utilities is changing 
base operations. 
4. Business Process Reengineering such as activity based costing (ABC) 
and direct vendor delivery is changing base operations. 
5. The Marine Corps has articulated a clear vision that describes what 
bases will look like in the future. 
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DESIGN FACTORS: 
1. Base services provided by Marines are effective. 
2. Base services provided by Civil Servants are effective. 
3. Base services provided by Contractors are effective. 
4. Marines are efficient at providing base services. 
5. Civil Servants are efficient at providing base services. 
6. Contractors are efficient at providing base services. 
7. Base personnel possess the knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA's) to 
successfully implement business reform. 
8. Base personnel possess the KSA's necessary to operate like a private 
sector business. 
9. The base financial management system effectively supports business 
operations. 
10. Base personnel possess the KSA's to successfully execute major 
service contracts. 
11. The existing base organization structure will support business reform. 
12. The base is prepared to integrate contractors into the workforce. 
13. Base personnel are rewarded for supporting business reform. 
14. A base staff job is detrimental to a Marine Officer's career. 




1. Marines are comfortable interacting with other Marines for base 
services. 
2. Marines are comfortable interacting with Civil Service employees for 
base services. 
3. Marines are comfortable interacting with Contractors for base 
services. 
4. Civil Service employees have the same values as Marines. 
5. Contract employees have the same values as Marines. 
6. The Installation Commander should be in control or command of 
service providers. 
7. Marine Corps bases should be integrated with the local community. 
8. Marine Corps bases should be consolidated regionally. 
9. Marine Corps bases should be consolidated with Navy bases. 
10. Marine Corps bases should be consolidated with bases of all services. 
11. Marine Corps bases should be integrated with the local community. 
12. Family housing should be provided by Marine Corps bases. 
13. Marines and their families have unique support requirements when 
compared with the public sector. 
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OUTPUTS: 
1. Providing a place for the FMF to train in support of improving their 
readiness is one of the most important outputs. 
2. Providing a place for the FMF to work and maintain their equipment 
readiness is one of the most important outputs. 
3. Providing a place for Marines and Family Members to live is one of 
the most important outputs. 
4. Providing support services for Marines is one of the most important 
outputs. 
5. Providing support services for Marines and Family members is one 
ofthe most important outputs. 
6. Providing support services for military retirees is one of the most 
important outputs. 
7. Providing support services for the community is one of the most 
important outputs. 
8. A standard measurement process is used for measuring the services 
provided. 
9. Performance indicators that identify how well services are provided 
are in use. 
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OUTCOMES: 
1. The quality of delivered services to stakeholders is one of the most 
important outcomes. 
2. The effectiveness of delivered services to stakeholders is one of the 
most important outcomes. 
3. The cost of delivered services to stakeholders is one of the most 
important outcomes. 
4. The efficiency of delivered services to stakeholders is one of the most 
important outcomes. 
5. Returning Marines to the FMF by reducing the number assigned to 
base operations is one of the most important outcomes. 
6. Outsourcing base services is one of the most important outcomes. 
7. The expectations of business reform have been adequately articulated 
by the Marine Corps. 
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4 5 3 3 2 3 4 4 4 2 3 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 3 4 2 3 2 2 2 4 5 5 2 4 2 3 4 
5 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 1 3 2 1 3 1 3 2 2 2 5 2 3 3 1 3 2 2 2 3 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 
6 5 3 5 4 4 5 2 4 5 4 4 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 5 4 4 5 4 1 5 2 2 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 
7 5 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 4 2 1 1 4 3 2 2 4 3 3 5 3 4 4 2 3 4 4 3 2 
8 4 2 2 2 2 1 2 5 2 5 4 2 2 2 2 4 1 4 5 2 2 3 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 1 2 5 4 4 4 
9 4 2 1 2 2 1 2 5 1 4 4 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 3 1 1 3 2 3 3 4 4 2 1 1 2 3 2 2 1 
10 4 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 4 4 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 5 2 3 4 3 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 1 
11 4 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 3 2 4 2 1 1 4 3 2 2 4 3 3 5 2 2 4 3 3 4 4 3 1 
12 5 2 4 4 3 4 2 2 5 4 4 3 4 2 3 2 4 2 3 5 4 4 3 5 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 4 3 4 
13 1 2 3 5 5 4 2 2 5 4 4 4 5 4 2 5 5 2 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 3 2 4 4 4 5 2 
a.m:tJTS 1 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 
2 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 3 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 
3 3 3 4 4 5 5 4 1 4 4 4 4 5 3 3 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 2 4 4 2 5 2 3 2 5 5 5 
4 5 4 3 4 5 5 4 4 3 4 4 3 5 4 3 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 
5 4 3 3 4 5 5 4 4 3 4 4 3 5 4 3 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 4 5 3 4 5 4 4 5 
6 2 3 3 4 5 4 4 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 4 3 2 3 4 3 2 3 5 2 2 2 2 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 
7 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 4 3 2 2 2 1 4 3 2 4 2 2 1 
8 2 1 3 2 2 3 2 1 1 4 3 2 2 2 1 4 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 1 2 2 
9 2 1 3 3 5 3 2 1 2 4 4 2 2 3 1 5 3 3 3 2 3 4 3 3 1 3 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 2 1 
OJTCXJve) 1 4 5 5 3 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 
2 4 5 5 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 
3 4 5 5 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 2 4 4 5 5 5 3 5 4 4 2 3 5 4 3 2 
4 5 5 5 3 5 5 4 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 3 5 4 3 4 
5 5 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 4 3 5 2 4 5 4 3 3 3 4 4 5 3 4 5 5 2 5 3 4 5 
6 2 1 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 3 4 2 3 1 2 4 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 3 1 1 1 1 3 2 3 2 
7 2 1 2 2 3 4 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 4 2 1 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 5 2 1 4 2 4 1 
8 2 1 4 4 4 4 2 4 1 4 4 4 4 5 3 4 5 5 5 2 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 5 2 4 2 
TABLEA-1: SURVEYDATA 
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~ Q.Estim M:AN SDEV R:utEd MN MIX MlE Ds:gee Pge/c t-OQ:irim PGH:CR CH pS a; 
llbTt:J:r AVE llSIGH ScJa"e Ye!Ml 
~ 1 4.Al 0.00 4 2 5 5 3 3J 2 f:gre am Ye; 
DIEICJ.I 2 4.<!3 Qffi 4 2 5 4 3 32 0 lgre 27.CB Ye; 
3 4.00 1.00 4 1 5 4 3 ZJ 5 lgre ~C» Ye; 
4 3.8) Q93 4 2 5 4 5 .25 5 lgre 18(5 Ye; 
5 203 Q82 2 1 5 2 43 1 6 Ds:gre 2lC» Ye; 
[ES(}.I 1 3.46 0.78 3 2 5 4 5 2J 10 lgre 13CV Ye; 
FtC"mS 2 3.00 O.EXl 4 2 5 4 1 ZJ 7 lgre ::!:te» Ye; 
3 3.37 O.ffi 3 2 4 3 3 16 16 lgre 11.<B Ye; 
4 3.00 1.00 3 1 5 4 12 17 6 lgre 32J 1\b 
5 3.71 0.75 4 2 5 4 2 23 10 lgre 19C5 Ye; 
6 3.31 Q93 3 1 5 4 5 18 12 lgre 11.<B Ye; 
7 274 1.C» 3 1 5 2 17 10 8 Dscgre 514 Ye; 
8 263 1.00 3 1 5 2 2J 7 8 Ds:gre 11.(B Ye; 
9 200 1.01 2 1 4 2 26 5 4 Ds:gre 19(5 Ye; 
10 3.11 1.CE 3 1 5 4 10 16 9 lgre 417 Ye; 
11 2Ee 1.CD 3 1 5 2 2J 9 6 Ds:g-re 900 Ye; 
12 2'51 Q92 3 1 5 3 16 4 15 Ds:gre 1Q(B Ye; 
13 237 Q84 2 1 4 2 ~ 5 6 Ds:gre 17.(5 Ye; 
14 294 0.94 3 1 4 3 10 11 14 Pgre 000 1\b 
15 2<() Q77 2 1 4 2 21 3 11 Ds:gre 16C5 Ye; 
ru:ut 1 4.<9 Q67 4 3 5 4 0 31 4 Pgre 2HB Ye; 
2 3.37 Q97 3 1 5 4 7 18 10 Pgre 900 Ye; 
3 285 Q81 3 1 4 3 12 8 15 Ds:gre 225 1\b 
4 3.CB 1.03 3 2 5 2 14 13 8 Ds:gre 000 1\b 
5 22) Qg) 2 1 5 2 22 1 12 Ds:gre 19C5 Ye; 
6 4.CD 1.CB 4 1 5 5 4 43 3 Pgre ~C» Ye; 
7 283 1.01 3 1 5 2 15 9 11 _Ds:gre 417 Ye; 
8 3.00 1.2) 3 1 5 2 16 17 2 Pgre 000 1\b 
9 2Al 1.13 2 1 5 2 ~ 6 5 Ds:gre 16CE Ye; 
10 2CB 1.16 2 1 5 1 ~ 5 6 Ds:gre 17.(5 Ye; 
11 2Ee 1.02 3 1 5 2 16 8 11 Ds:g-re 613 Ye; 
12 3.25 1.C» 3 1 5 4 9 15 11 Pgre 4.17 Ye; 
13 3.77 1.19 4 1 5 4 8 .25 2 Pgre 15CE Ye; 
QJFU1S 1 4.85 Q33 5 4 5 5 0 35 0 Pgre :BCB Ye; 
2 4.63 Qs:J 5 3 5 5 0 33 2 Pgre 31.CB Ye; 
3 3.83 1.07 4 1 5 4 5 .25 5 Pgre 18C5 Ye; 
4 4.Al Q63 4 3 5 4 0 31 4 Pgre 2aCB Ye; 
5 4.00 Q70 4 3 5 4 0 43 7 Pgre ale» Ye; 
6 3.23 Q94 3 2 5 4 10 16 9 Pgre 4.17 Ye; 
7 203 Q85 2 1 4 2 43 3 4 Ds:g-re 23.1:» Ye; 
8 223 Q85 2 1 4 2 
.25 4 6 Ds:rrre 19C5 Ye; 
9 263 1.00 3 1 5 2 17 7 11 Ds:gre 810 Ye; 
OJIXJJES 1 4.<KJ Qffi 4 3 5 4 0 3:+ 1 f:gre 32.CB Ye; 
2 4.46 O.ffi 4 3 5 4 0 3:+ 1 Pgre 32.CB Ye; 
3 3.97 0.85 4 2 5 4 3 :B 4 Pgre 23.1:» Ye; 
4 4.23 0.63 4 3 5 4 0 31 4 Pgre 2aCB Ye; 
5 3.00 Qg) 4 2 5 4 3 .25 7 Pgre 2J.C5 Ye; 
6 231 1.02 2 1 4 2 2J 5 10 Ds:g-re 13(Y Ye; 
7 2<() 0.00 2 1 5 2 22 5 8 Ds:g-re 15CE Ye; 
8 3.51 1.17 4 1 5 4 9 23 3 Pgre 12CV Ye; 
TABLEA-2: SURVEYDATAANALYSIS 
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